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Today’s operating systems are large, complex, and plagued with vulnerabilities that allow
perpetrators to exploit them for profit. The constant rise in the number of software weak-
nesses, coupled with the sophistication of modern adversaries, make the need for effective
and adaptive defenses more critical than ever. In this dissertation, we develop a set of novel
protection mechanisms, and introduce new concepts and techniques to secure commodity
operating systems against attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in kernel code.
Modern OSes opt for a shared process/kernel model to minimize the overhead of opera-
tions that cross protection domains. However, this design choice provides a unique vantage
point to local attackers, as it allows them to control—both in terms of permissions and
contents—part of the memory that is accessible by the kernel, easily circumventing protec-
tions like kernel-space ASLR and WˆX. Attacks that leverage the weak separation between
user and kernel space, characterized as return-to-user (ret2usr) attacks, have been the de
facto kernel exploitation technique in virtually every major OS, while they are not limited
to the x86 platform, but have also targeted ARM and others.
Given the multi-OS and cross-architecture nature of ret2usr threats, we propose kGuard:
a kernel protection mechanism, realized as a cross-platform compiler extension, which can
safeguard any 32- or 64-bit OS kernel from ret2usr attacks. kGuard enforces strong address
space segregation by instrumenting exploitable control transfers with dynamic Control-
Flow Assertions (CFAs). CFAs, a new confinement (inline monitoring) concept that we
introduce, act as guards that prevent the unconstrained transition of privileged execution
paths to user space. To thwart attacks against itself, kGuard also incorporates two novel
code diversification techniques: code inflation and CFA motion. Both countermeasures
randomize the location of the inline guards, creating a moving target for an attacker that
tries to pinpoint their exact placement to evade kGuard. Evaluation results indicate that
kGuard provides comprehensive ret2usr protection with negligible overhead (∼1%).
Furthermore, we expose a set of additional kernel design practices that trade stronger
isolation for performance, all of which can be harnessed to deconstruct kernel isolation. To
demonstrate the significance of the problem, we introduce a new kernel exploitation tech-
nique, dubbed return-to-direct-mapped memory (ret2dir), which relies on inherent properties
of the memory management (sub)system of modern OSes to bypass every ret2usr defense
to date. To illustrate the effectiveness of ret2dir, we outline a principled methodology for
constructing reliable exploits against hardened targets. We further apply it on real-world
kernel exploits for x86, x86-64, and ARM Linux, transforming them into ret2dir-equivalents
that bypass deployed ret2usr protections, like Intel SMEP and ARM PXN.
Finally, we introduce the concept of eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO): a mem-
ory management approach that prevents the implicit sharing of page frames among user
processes and the kernel, ensuring that user-controlled content can no longer be injected
into kernel space using ret2dir. We built XPFO on Linux and implemented a set of opti-
mizations, related to TLB handling and page frame content sanitization, to minimize its
performance penalty. Evaluation results show that our proposed defense offers effective
protection against ret2dir attacks with low runtime overhead (<3%).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The security of a computer system can only be as good as that of the underlying Operating
System (OS) kernel [121]. By compromising the kernel, attackers can escape isolation
and confinement mechanisms, bypass access control and policy enforcement, and elevate
privileges. Nevertheless, until recently, attackers focused mostly on the exploitation of
vulnerabilities in server and client applications, which often run with administrative rights,
as they are (for the most part) less complex to analyze and easier to compromise [202, 4].
During the past few years, however, the kernel has become an equally attractive target.
Continuing the increasing trend of the previous years, in 2013 there were 355 reported kernel
vulnerabilities according to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [155], 140 more than
in 2012, as shown in Figure 1.1. Admittedly, the exploitation of user-level software has
become much harder, as recent versions of popular OSes come with numerous protections
and exploit mitigations [7]: the principle of least privilege [185] is better enforced in user
accounts and system services [135, 177, 176, 216], compilers offer more protections against
common software flaws [56, 147, 160], and highly targeted applications, such as browsers
and document viewers, have started to employ sandboxing [150, 154, 22, 20, 21, 137].
On the other hand, the kernel has a huge codebase and an attack surface that keeps
increasing due to the constant addition of new features [124]. Indicatively, the size of
the Linux kernel in terms of lines of code has more than doubled, from 6.6 MLOC in
v2.6.11 to 16.9 MLOC in v3.10 [54]. Naturally, instead of putting significant effort to
exploit applications fortified with numerous protections and sandboxes, attackers often turn








































































Figure 1.1: Kernel vulnerabilities (per-year) according to NVD [155].
their attention to the kernel [183]. For instance, in recent exploits against Chrome and
Adobe Reader, after successfully gaining code execution, the attackers exploited kernel
vulnerabilities to break out of the respective sandboxed processes [157, 10].
Opportunities for kernel exploitation are abundant. As an example consider the Linux
kernel, which has been plagued by common software flaws, such as stack and heap buffer
overflows [41, 30, 44], NULL pointer and pointer arithmetic errors [27, 23], use-after-free and
format string bugs [45, 43], memory disclosure vulnerabilities [36, 29], integer overflows [33,
23], signedness errors [42, 34], race conditions [32, 24], as well as missing authorization
checks and argument sanitization vulnerabilities [39, 35, 40, 38].
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The exploitation of these bugs is particularly effective, despite the existence of kernel
protection mechanisms (e.g., kernel-space ASLR [68] and WˆX [209, 128]), due to the weak
separation between user and kernel space. Although user programs cannot access directly
kernel code or data, the opposite is not true, as the kernel is mapped inside the address
space of each process for performance reasons. This design allows an attacker to execute
code in privileged mode, or tamper-with critical kernel data structures, by exploiting a
kernel vulnerability and redirecting the control or data flow of the kernel to code or data in
user space. Attacks of this kind, known as return-to-user (ret2usr) [116], affect all major
OSes, like Linux [25, 28], Windows [191], and the BSDs [31, 190, 193], while they are not
limited to the x86/x86-64 architecture [37], but also impact ARM [71], DEC Alpha [77],
and PowerPC [179].
1.1 Hypothesis
Empirical evidence [69, 79, 80, 78, 74, 72, 76, 73, 76, 73, 70, 77, 75, 158, 71] suggests
that the execution model imposed by a virtual memory layout that weakly separates the
kernel from user processes makes kernel exploitation a fundamentally different craft from the
exploitation of userland software [202, 173]. To that end, we hypothesize that the security
posture of modern OSes can be improved by employing a synergy of defenses and exploit
prevention techniques, which guarantee the strong isolation between user and kernel space.
1.2 Thesis Statement
This thesis argues that compiler-assisted control-flow confinement and code diversification,
coupled with a physical memory management approach that enforces the explicit use of
page frames by different security contexts (user vs. kernel), can efficiently and effectively
protect the OS kernel against attacks that leverage the weak segregation of address spaces.
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1.3 Contributions
1. We present the design and implementation of kGuard: a compiler plugin that protects
commodity OS kernels from ret2usr attacks. kGuard operates by instrumenting ex-
ploitable control flow transfers with dynamic Control-Flow Assertions (CFAs). CFAs,
a new confinement (inline monitoring) concept that we introduced, act as “guards”
that prevent (at runtime) the unconstrained transition of privileged execution paths
to user space. Our approach does not entail additional software (e.g., hypervisor or
VMM) or special hardware.
2. We introduce two novel code diversification techniques: (a.) code inflation and (b.)
CFA motion. Both of them randomize the location of CFA-protected branches, during
compilation and at run time, creating a moving target for an attacker that tries to
pinpoint the exact placement of the fine-grained inline guards and bypass them to
evade kGuard.
3. We implement kGuard as a GCC extension, which is publicly available. Its main-
tenance cost is low and can successfully compile functional x86/x86-64 Linux and
BSD kernels. More importantly, it can be easily combined with other compiler-based
protection mechanisms.
4. We assess the effectiveness of kGuard using real privilege escalation attacks against
32- and 64-bit Linux kernels. In all cases, kGuard was able to successfully detect and
prevent the respective exploitation attempt.
5. We evaluate the performance of kGuard using a set of macro- and micro-benchmarks.
Our technique incurs minimal runtime overhead on both x86 and x86-64 Linux. Specif-
ically, we show negligible impact on real-life applications, and moderate overhead on
system call and I/O latency.
6. We expose a fundamental design weakness in the memory management (sub)system of
modern OSes, by introducing the concept of return-to-direct-mapped memory (ret2dir)
attacks. ret2dir attacks exploit the kernel’s direct-mapped RAM region(s) to bypass
existing ret2usr protection (i.e., SMEP, SMAP, PXN, PAN, KERNEXEC, UDEREF).
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7. We introduce a detailed methodology for mounting reliable ret2dir attacks against x86,
x86-64, AArch32, and AArch64 Linux systems, along with two techniques for forcing
user-space exploit payloads to “emerge” within the kernel’s direct-mapped physical
memory area and accurately pinpointing their location.
8. We experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of ret2dir attacks using a set of nine (eight
real-world and one artificial) exploits against different Linux kernel configurations and
protection mechanisms. In all cases, our transformed exploits bypass the deployed
ret2usr protections.
9. We present the design, implementation, and evaluation of an exclusive page frame
ownership (XPFO) scheme for the Linux kernel, which protects against ret2dir attacks
with negligible (in most cases) runtime overhead.
10. We make publicly available: (i) our prototype implementation of XPFO, and (ii) the
complete set of our ret2dir exploits. The latter can be used to educate the community
regarding ret2dir attacks and evaluate the effectiveness of future ret2dir defenses.
1.4 Dissertation Roadmap
Chapter 2 provides background information on virtual memory organization and kernel
exploitation, and surveys the (state-of-the-art) kernel protection mechanisms in modern
OSes. Chapter 3 covers the design, implementation, and evaluation of kGuard. Chapter 4
introduces the concept of ret2dir attacks along with a detailed methodology for mounting
such attacks in a plethora of different systems and configurations. Chapter 5 presents the
design, implementation, and evaluation of XPFO, which provides protection against attacks
that (ab)use the implicit sharing of physical memory between user processes and the kernel.
Finally, this dissertation concludes in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Virtual Memory Organization
Private virtual address spaces are the standard OS abstraction for separating and confining
user processes. Programs, however, cannot run in absolute isolation as they need to interact
with the OS to perform I/O, acquire or share memory, request device access, communicate
with other processes, etc. Designs for safely combining different protection domains (e.g.,
the OS kernel and user programs) range between two extremes. At one extreme, exper-
imental OSes, like Microsoft’s Singularity [101], follow a single address space design, by
placing the kernel and all user processes into a single, privileged address space and estab-
lishing boundaries using software isolation. At the other extreme, OSes that build upon
microkernel-based designs [2], such as MINIX [99] and L4 [130], confine user process and
kernel components into separate, hardware-enforced address spaces.
Commodity OSes, such as Linux and Linux-derived spin-offs (Android [95], Chrome
OS [96], Firefox OS [153], Tizen [133], Sailfish OS [106]), the BSDs (FreeBSD [204], NetBSD
[206], OpenBSD [207]), Oracle Solaris [163], and Microsoft Windows [146], adopt a more
coarse-grained variant of the latter design approach, and divide the virtual address space
into two parts; kernel and user space. The first part is assigned to kernel code and data,
kernel modules, and dynamic kernel memory, while the second to user processes (e.g.,
program code and data, heap and stack memory, shared libraries).
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In most platforms, the separation between the two parts (i.e., the user/kernel split) is
enforced by a combination of two hardware features: (i) a set of CPU modes (protection
rings) [107, 186]; and (ii) a memory management unit (MMU). The x86/x86-64 architecture
supports four basic protection rings, with the kernel running in the most privileged one (ring
0) and user applications in the least privileged (ring 3). Similarly, PowerPC and MIPS have
two basic CPU modes, SPARC has three, and ARM seven.1 The MMU, programmed using
privileged, special-purpose instructions, implements hierarchical memory protection and
ensures that memory assigned to a certain ring is not accessible by code executing in less
privileged rings. The net effect of the above is the complete isolation of kernel space from
user programs (i.e., code running in user mode cannot access the kernel directly).
Although some platforms support fully separate kernel and user address spaces, like
Oracle Solaris on UltraSPARC [140], contemporary OSes running on popular CPUs (e.g.,
x86 and ARM), employ a shared layout, in which the kernel is mapped inside the address
space of every user process. For example, in the x86 and 32-bit ARM (AArch32) architec-
tures, the Linux kernel is typically mapped to the upper 1GB part of the virtual address
space, a split also known as “3G/1G” [46, 118].2 In x86-64 and 64-bit ARM (AArch64)
the Linux kernel is placed in the upper canonical half ([0xFFFF800000000000 : 264 − 1]
in x86-64 [120] and [0xFFFFFF8000000000 : 264 − 1] in AArch64 [139]). Similar splits
are used in BSD [142], Oracle Solaris (x86) [140], and Microsoft Windows [151, 149]. This
design minimizes the overhead of crossing protection domains and facilitates fast user-kernel
interactions: when servicing a system call, or handling an exception, the kernel is running
within the context of a preempted process; flushing the TLB is not necessary [102], while
the kernel can access user space directly to read user data or write the result of a system
call.
1Modern CPUs support additional modes (rings): x86/x86-64 offers two more, colloquially known as ring
-1 (hardware-assisted virtualization) and -2 (system management mode). SPARC has up to four additional
modes (reset, error, debug, hyper-privileged), MIPS two (debug, supervisor), and PowerPC one (hypervisor).
2Linux also supports 2G/2G and 1G/3G splits. A patch for a 4G/4G split in x86 exists [102], but it was
never included in the mainline kernel for performance reasons (it requires a full TLB flush per system call).
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2.2 Kernel Exploitation
Despite the fact that both kernel code and userland software are plagued by common types of
vulnerabilities, such as stack and heap buffer overflows [44, 41, 30], NULL pointer and pointer
arithmetic errors [27], memory disclosure vulnerabilities [36, 29], use-after-free and format
string bugs [45, 43], signedness errors [42, 34], integer overflows [33, 23], race conditions [32,
24], as well as missing authorization checks and poor argument sanitization bugs [39, 35,
40, 38] (interested readers are referred to the studies of Chen et al. [18], Chou et al. [19],
and Palix et al. [166], for a detailed analysis of kernel bugs in Linux and OpenBSD), the
execution model imposed by the shared virtual memory layout, between the kernel and user
programs, makes kernel exploitation (in commodity OSes) a fundamentally different craft
from the exploitation of userland software.
In particular, the shared address space provides a unique vantage point to local attackers
(i.e., attackers with the ability to execute programs on the OS), as it enables them to
control—both in terms of contents and permissions—part of the memory accessible by the
kernel [202]. Simply put, attackers can execute shellcode with kernel rights by hijacking a
(privileged) kernel control path and redirecting it to user space, effectively invalidating the
protection(s) offered by standard defenses, like kernel-space ASLR [68] and WˆX [128, 209].
Attacks of this kind, known as return-to-user (ret2usr), can be traced back to the early
1970’s, as demonstrated by the PDP-10 “address wraparound” fault [175]. Over the past
decade, however, ret2usr has been promoted to the de facto kernel exploitation technique
in modern OSes [218, 4, 109, 69, 197].
In a ret2usr attack, kernel data is overwritten with user-space addresses, usually after
the exploitation of memory corruption bugs in kernel code [173]. Attackers primarily aim
for control data, such as return addresses [192], dispatch tables [79, 69], and function point-
ers [80, 78, 77, 74], because they directly facilitate arbitrary code execution [201]. Pointers
to critical data structures stored in the kernel’s heap [72] or the global data section [79] are
also common targets, since they allow attackers to tamper with critical data contained in
these structures by mapping fake copies in user space [76, 73, 72].
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Figure 2.1: Operation of ret2usr attacks. Kernel code or data pointers are hijacked and
redirected to controlled code or data in user space (tampered-with data structures may
further contain pointers to code).
Typically, the targeted data structures contain function pointers or data that affect the
control flow of the kernel, so as to diverge execution to arbitrary locations. The culmination
of all ret2usr attacks, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, is the following: the control/data flow of
the kernel is hijacked and redirected to user space code/data [116].
Most ret2usr exploits use a multi-stage shellcode, with a first stage that lies in user
space and “glues” together kernel functions (i.e., the second stage) to perform privilege
escalation. Technically, ret2usr expects the kernel to run within the context of a process
controlled by the attacker for exploitation to be reliable. However, kernel bugs have been
identified and exploited in interrupt service routines [152]. In such cases, where the kernel is
either running in interrupt context or in a process context beyond the attacker’s control [184,
70], the respective shellcode has to be injected in kernel space or constructed using code
gadgets from the kernel’s executable segments using Return-/Jump-Oriented Programming
(ROP/JOP) [17, 100, 195]. The latter approach is gaining popularity in real-world exploits,
due to the increased adoption of kernel hardening techniques [138, 50, 220, 128, 210, 209].
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Figure 2.2: ret2usr protection mechanisms. KERNEXEC/UDEREF, SMEP/SMAP, and
PXN/PAN prevent arbitrary kernel-to-user control transfers and pointer dereferences.
Interestingly, software bugs that are only a source of instability in user programs, like NULL
pointer dereferences, can have more dire effects when found in an OS kernel that weakly
(asymmetrically) separates kernel from user space. Brad Spengler [199] demonstrated how
a NULL pointer dereference bug, triggered by invoking a system call with specially-crafted
parameters, can be (ab)used to perform a ret2usr attack.
Earlier, it was generally thought that such flaws could only be used to perform denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks [67], but Spengler’s exploit showed how mapping asymmetrically-
separated code segments (i.e., kernel code and data are inaccessible from code running in
user mode, but the kernel has complete and unrestricted access to the whole address space,
which includes user code and data), with different rights, inside the same scope can be
exploited to execute arbitrary user code with kernel privilege. A detailed analysis of the
kernel bug exploited by Spengler, along with a step-by-step walk-through of a NULL function
pointer vulnerability [26] that affected all Linux kernel versions released between May 2001
and August 2009 (v2.4.4/v2.6.0 – v2.4.37/v2.6.30.4), can be found in Appendix A.
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2.3 Kernel Protection
Return-to-user attacks are yet another incarnation of the confused deputy problem [98].
Due to the weak virtual address space separation, a user cheats the kernel (deputy) to
misuse its ambient authority and execute (or access) arbitrary, non-kernel code (or data)
with elevated privilege. Given the multi-architecture [77, 179] and multi-OS [197, 193, 191,
190, 31, 60] nature of the problem, several defense mechanisms exist for it. In the remainder
of this section, we discuss ret2usr defenses that are available in modern OSes and considered
standard practice in kernel protection, with the help of Figure 2.2.
2.3.1 mmap
The first ret2usr mitigation strategy adopted by Linux [63, 180], {Free, Open}BSD [205],
and Microsoft Windows [145], is based on restricting the ability to memory-map the first
pages of the virtual address space (typically 4KB – 64KB). This is achieved by modifying the
mmap system call (or VirtualAlloc in Windows [148]) to apply the respective restrictions
and preventing binaries from requesting low address mappings.
Unfortunately, this approach has several limitations. First and foremost, it does not
solve the actual problem, which is the weak separation of spaces. Disallowing access to
lower logical addresses is a protection scheme only against exploits that rely on NULL pointer
bugs [201, 179], as it does not defend against exploits where the control, or data, flow is
hijacked and redirected to memory pages above the forbidden region (e.g., by nullifying
one or two bytes of a kernel pointer, or overwriting a branch target with an arbitrary
value) [79, 75]. Second, if an attacker bypasses the restriction imposed by mmap, she can
still orchestrate a ret2usr attack [208]. Third, it breaks compatibility with applications that
demand access to low logical addresses [8, 217, 66, 82].
2.3.2 KERNEXEC and UDEREF
KERNEXEC and UDEREF are two features of the PaX [168] Linux hardening patch set,
which prevent control transfers and pointer dereferences from kernel to user space.
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In x86, KERNEXEC and UDEREF rely on memory segmentation3 to map kernel space into
a 1GB segment (assuming a 3G/1G split) that returns a memory fault whenever privileged
code tries to dereference pointers to, or fetch instructions from, non-kernel addresses [169].
In x86-64, due to the lack of segmentation support, UDEREF/amd64 [170] remaps user
space memory into a different, non-executable (shadow) area when execution enters the
kernel (and restores it on exit), to prevent user-space pointer dereferences. Additionally,
the shadow area is marked as non-executable to disallow control-flow transfers to user code.
As the overhead of remapping memory is significant, an alternative for x86-64 systems is
to enable KERNEXEC/amd64 [171], which has much lower overhead, but offers protection
against only control-flow hijacking attacks. KERNEXEC/amd64 is implemented as a GCC
plugin that instruments kernel code with small snippets that confine exploitable control
transfers (i.e., indirect call and ret instructions) to the upper canonical half of the vir-
tual address space. Overall, KERNEXEC and UDEREF provide comprehensive protection
against ret2usr attacks, but they are platform-specific (available only in Linux and mainly
in x86/x86-64), and require kernel patching. Yet, ret2usr attacks have been demonstrated
in non-x86 Linux architectures, including DEC Alpha [77] and PowerPC [179]. Recently,
both features were ported to the ARM architecture [200], but the respective patches added
support only for AArch32.
2.3.3 SMEP/PXN and SMAP/PAN
Supervisor Mode Execute Protection (SMEP) [88] and Supervisor Mode Access Prevention
(SMAP) [55] are two recent features of Intel processors that facilitate stronger (symmet-
ric) address space separation (latest Linux kernels support both features [220, 50]). Once
enabled, by setting CR4.SMEP and CR4.SMAP, they result into a page fault whenever an
instruction fetch (or data access) is attempted from a linear address whose entry in the
page table has the User/Supervisor bit asserted (i.e., marked as user mode page).
SMEP provides analogous protection to KERNEXEC, without relying on segmentation or
code instrumentation, whereas SMAP operates similarly to UDEREF, in absence of the
performance penalty of page table manipulation upon kernel entry and exit [102].
3In x86, UDEREF restricts SS, DS, and ES. CS is taken care by KERNEXEC.
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However, both hardware features are vendor-specific—AMD and other x86-compatible
CPU vendors have not yet announced similar extensions—and do not protect legacy systems.
Specifically, SMEP/SMAP is available only on Intel Ivy Bridge/Haswell (and later) CPUs,
and support for it was added in Linux kernel v3.5/v3.7 [220, 50], OpenBSD v5.3 [161],
FreeBSD v9 (SMEP only) [9], and Microsoft Windows v8 (SMEP only) [203]. NetBSD
and Oracle Solaris have yet to add support for both SMEP and SMAP. Likewise, ARM
introduced Privileged Execute-Never (PXN) [131] and Privileged Access-Never (PAN) [14],
two features that operate similarly to SMEP and SMAP.
2.4 Other Work
2.4.1 Control-flow Confinement
Program Shepherding [119], Strata [188], and Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [1], employ dy-
namic binary instrumentation and binary rewriting for retrofitting control-flow confinement
capabilities into unmodified binaries. Specifically, they rewrite programs so that branch
targets are given labels, and every indirect branch instruction is prepended with a check,
which ensures that the target’s label is in accordance with a precomputed control-flow
graph (CFG). Regardless of the large performance overhead that these approaches typically
incur—Program Shepherding exhibits ∼100% overhead on the SPEC benchmark, while CFI
has an average overhead of 16% (21% when a shadow stack is used), and a maximum of
45%, on the same test suite—CFI-based techniques are not effective against ret2usr attacks.
The integrity of a label-based CFI mechanism is guaranteed as long as the attacker
cannot overwrite the code of the protected binary or execute user-provided data. However,
during a ret2usr attack, the attacker completely controls user space memory, both in terms
of contents and rights (see Section 2.2), and thereby can subvert CFI by prepending user-
provided shellcode with the respective label. As an example consider Listing A.1 and
assume that the attacker has managed to overwrite the function pointer sendpage with a
user space address. CFI will prepend the instruction that invokes sendpage with an inline
check that fetches a label ID (placed right before the first instruction of every function that
sendpage can point to) and compares it with the allowed label ID(s). If the two labels
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match, the control transfer will be authorized. As the attacker controls the contents and
rights of the memory that sendpage points at in user space, she can prepend her code
with the label ID that will authorize the control transfer.
More importantly, coarse-grained CFI schemes that rely on an imprecise CGF (e.g.,
CCFIR [221], binCFI [222], kBouncer [167]) have recently shown to be vulnerable to code-
reuse attacks [93, 16, 59, 94], and, as Petroni and Hicks [174] observed, computing in advance
a precise CFG for a modern kernel is a nontrivial task, due to the rich control structure
and the several levels of interrupt handling and concurrency of kernel code.
2.4.2 Hypervisor-based Protection
Garfinkel and Rosenblum proposed Livewire [84], which was one of the first systems to
use a virtual machine monitor (VMM) for implementing invariant-based kernel protection.
Similarly, Grizzard used a VMM for monitoring kernel execution and validating control
flow [97]. For LMBench, Grizzard reported an average overhead of 30%, and a maximum
of 74%, atop VMM’s performance penalty. SecVisor [194] is a tiny hypervisor that ensures
the integrity of commodity OS kernels. SecVisor relies on physical memory virtualization
for protecting against code injection attacks and kernel rootkits, by allowing only approved
code to execute in kernel mode and ensuring that such code cannot be modified. However, it
requires a modern CPU that supports hardware virtualization, as well as kernel patching to
add the respective hypercalls that authorize module loading. NICKLE [181] offers similar
guarantees, without requiring any OS modification, by relying on an innovative memory
shadowing scheme and real-time kernel code authentication via VMM introspection. Petroni
and Hicks proposed state-based CFI (SBCFI) [174], which reports violations of the kernel’s
control flow due to the presence of rootkits. Similarly, Lares [172] and HookSafe [215] protect
kernel hooks (including function pointers) from being manipulated by kernel malware.




It is our belief that compiler-assisted control-flow confinement and code diversification can
effectively, and efficiently, protect commodity OS kernels against ret2usr attacks. In sup-
port of this claim, in this chapter, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation
of kGuard: a cross-platform (i.e., multi-OS and many-architecture), compiler-based solu-
tion that enforces strong address space segregation, without relying on special hardware
features [169, 88, 138] or custom hypervisors [194, 181].
kGuard instruments, at compile time, exploitable control transfers with dynamic control-
flow assertions (CFAs) that, at runtime, prevent the unconstrained transition of privileged
control paths to user space. The injected CFAs perform a small runtime check to verify
that the target address of every (privileged) indirect branch instruction is always in kernel
space, as shown in Figure 3.1. If the assertion is true, execution continues normally, while
if it fails because of a violation, execution is transferred to a handler that was inserted
during compilation. The default handler appends a warning message to the kernel log and
halts the system. We choose to coerce assertion failures into a kernel fail-stop to prevent
unsafe conditions, such as leaving the OS into an inconsistent state (e.g., by aborting an
in-flight kernel thread that holds locks or other resources). In Section 3.5, we discuss how
kGuard can be extended to support custom handlers for facilitating forensic analyses, error
virtualization [196], selective confinement, and protection against persistent attacks.













Figure 3.1: CFA-based control-flow confinement. The inserted CFAs perform a small run-
time check to verify that the target address of every (privileged) indirect branch instruction
is always in kernel space.
After compiling a kernel with kGuard, its execution is confined to the privileged address
space segment (e.g., addresses higher than 0xC0000000 in x86 Linux and {Free, Net}BSD;
see Section 2.1). However, note that kGuard does not rely on any mapping restriction; the
previously-disallowed low virtual memory addresses can be dispensed to processes, lifting
the compatibility issues with various applications [8, 82, 217, 66]. Furthermore, the inserted
CFAs cannot be bypassed using mmap tricks [208], nor can they be circumvented by elabo-
rate exploits that jump to memory pages above the forbidden low memory region [79, 75].
More importantly, the kernel can still read and write user memory, so its functionality
remains unaffected.
3.1.1 Threat Model
We ascertain an adversary that is able to completely overwrite, partially corrupt (e.g.,
zero out only certain bytes), or nullify control data stored inside the address space of the
kernel. Note that overwriting certain data (i.e., code pointers) with arbitrary values, differs
significantly from overwriting arbitrary kernel memory. kGuard does not deal with such an
adversary. In addition, we assume that the attacker can tamper-with whole data structures
(e.g., by mangling data pointers; see Figure 2.1), which in turn may contain control data.
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Our technique is straightforward and guarantees that ret2usr attacks are prevented.
However, it is not a panacea that protects the kernel from all types control-flow hijacking
attacks. For instance, kGuard does not address direct code-injection in kernel space, nor
does it thwart code-reuse attacks that utilize ROP/JOP [100, 17]. Nevertheless, note the
following. First and foremost, our approach is orthogonal to many solutions that do protect
against such threats [127, 6, 194, 169, 108, 56]. Second, the unique nature of address space
sharing casts many protection schemes, for the aforementioned problems, as ineffective. As
an example, consider again the case of ROP/JOP or code-injection in the kernel setting.
No matter what anti-ROP [1, 127, 159], ASLR [68], or WˆX [128, 209] techniques have been
utilized, the attacker can still execute arbitrary code, as long as there is no strict user/-
kernel separation, by mapping her code to user space and transferring control to it (e.g.,
after hijacking a privileged control path).
Finally, in order to protect kGuard from being subverted, we utilize two lightweight
diversification techniques for the .text segment of the kernel/modules, which can also
mitigate kernel-level attacks that use code “gadgets” in a ROP/JOP fashion (see Sec-
tion 3.2.2.2). Nevertheless, the aim of kGuard is not to provide strict control-flow integrity
for the kernel, but rather protect against attacks that leverage the weak segregation of
address spaces.
3.2 Design
In this section, we discuss the fundamental aspects of kGuard using examples based on x86
Linux. However, note that kGuard is by no means restricted to 32-bit systems or Linux; it
can protect any OS kernel that suffers from ret2usr attacks, running both on 32- and 64-bit
CPUs. kGuard “guards” indirect control transfers from exploitation. In the x86 instruction
set architecture (ISA), such control transfers are performed using the call/jmp instruction
with a register or memory operand, and the ret instruction, which always takes an implicit
memory operand (i.e., the saved return address). kGuard injects CFAs in all such cases to
assert that the branch target is located in kernel space.
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81 fb 00 00 00 c0 ; cmp $0xc0000000 ,%ebx
73 05 ; j a e c a l l l b l
bb f1 f8 5a c0 ; mov $0xc05af8f1 ,%ebx
f f d3 ; c a l l l b l : c a l l ∗%ebx
Listing 3.1: CFAR applied on an indirect call in x86 Linux (drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c). The
call instruction is instrumented with 3 additional instructions (cmp, jae, mov).
register void ∗ t a r g e t add r e s s ;
. . .
i f ( t a r g e t add r e s s < 0xC0000000 )
t a r g e t add r e s s = &v i o l a t i o n h and l e r ;
c a l l ∗ t a r g e t add r e s s ;
Listing 3.2: CFAR in C-like code (x86).
Specifically, kGuard uses two different CFA types, namely CFAR and CFAM, depending
on whether the instruction that we want to confine uses a register or memory operand.
Listing 3.1 shows a CFAR example. The code is from the show() routine of the cpufreq
driver. kGuard instruments the indirect call (call *%ebx) with 3 additional instruc-
tions. First, the cmp instruction compares the %ebx register with the lowest kernel address
0xC0000000.1 If the assertion is true, the control transfer is authorized by jumping to the
call instruction. Otherwise, the mov instruction loads the address of the violation handler
(0xC05AF8F1; kguard panic()) into the branch register and proceeds to execute call,
which will result into invoking our violation handler. In C-like code, this is equivalent to
injecting the statements shown in Listing 3.2.
Similarly, a CFAM confines indirect branches that use memory operands. Listing 3.3
illustrates how kGuard instruments an indirect control transfer in sock sendpage().
The indirect call (call *0x50(%ebx)) is prepended by a sequence of 10 instructions
that perform two distinct assertions. CFAM not only asserts that the branch target is within
1The same is true for x86 FreeBSD/NetBSD, whereas for x86-64 Linux the check should be with address
0xFFFF800000000000. OpenBSD maps the kernel to the upper 512MB of the virtual address space, and
hence, its base address in x86 CPUs is 0xD0000000.
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57 ; push %ed i
8d 7b 50 ; l e a 0x50(%ebx) ,% ed i
81 f f 00 00 00 c0 ; cmp $0xc0000000 ,% ed i
73 06 ; j a e kmem lbl
5 f ; pop %ed i
e8 99 e2 0 f 00 ; c a l l 0 xc05a f8 f1
5 f ; kmem lbl : pop %ed i
81 7b 50 00 00 00 c0 ; cmpl $0xc0000000 , 0 x50(%ebx )
73 05 ; j a e c a l l l b l
c7 43 50 f1 f8 5a c0 ; movl $0xc05af8f1 , 0 x50(%ebx )
f f 53 50 ; c a l l l b l : c a l l ∗0x50(%ebx )
Listing 3.3: CFAM applied on an indirect call in x86 Linux (net/socket.c). The call instruction
is prepended with a sequence of 10 instructions (push – movl).
register void ∗ t a r g e t ad d r e s s l o c ;
void ∗ t a r g e t add r e s s ;
. . .
t a r g e t ad d r e s s l o c = &targe t addr ;
i f ( t a r g e t ad d r e s s l o c < 0xC0000000 )
c a l l v i o l a t i o n h and l e r ;
i f ( t a r g e t add r e s s < 0xC0000000 )
t a r g e t add r e s s = &v i o l a t i o n h and l e r ;
c a l l ∗ t a r g e t add r e s s ;
Listing 3.4: CFAM in C-like code (x86).
the kernel address space, but also ensures that the memory address where the branch target
is loaded from is also in kernel space. The latter is necessary for protecting against cases
where the attacker has managed to hijack a data pointer to a structure that contains
code pointers (see Figure 2.1). Listing 3.4 illustrates how this can be represented in C-
like code. In order to perform this dual check, we first need to spill one of the registers
in use, unless the basic block where the CFA is injected has spare registers, so that we
can use it as a temporary variable (%edi in our example). The address of the memory
location that stores the branch target (%ebx + 0x50), is dynamically resolved via an
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81 7b 50 00 00 00 c0 ; cmpl $0xc0000000 , 0 xc123beef
73 05 ; j a e c a l l l b l
c7 43 50 f1 f8 5a c0 ; movl $0xc05af8f1 , 0 xc123beef
f f 53 50 ; c a l l l b l : c a l l ∗0 xc123beef
Listing 3.5: Optimized CFAM. The operand of the call instruction is loaded from the .data
segment of the kernel.
arithmetic expression entailing registers and constant offsets. We load its effective address
into %edi (lea 0x50(%ebx),%edi), and proceed to verify that it points in kernel space.
If a violation is detected, the spilled register is restored and control is transferred to the
runtime violation handler (call 0xc05af8f1). Otherwise, we proceed with restoring the
spilled register and confine the indirect branch instruction similarly to the CFAR case.
3.2.1 Optimizations
In certain cases, we can statically determine if the address of the memory location that
holds a branch target is always mapped in kernel space. Examples include a branch operand
read from the kernel stack (assuming that the attacker has not seized control of the stack
pointer), or taken from a global data structure mapped at a fixed address inside the .data
or .rodata segment of the kernel. In such cases, the first assertion of a CFAM guard will
always be true, since the branch operand is kernel memory. We optimize such scenarios by
removing the redundant assertion, effectively reducing the size of the CFA to 3 instructions,
as shown in Listing 3.5.
3.2.2 Mechanism Protection
CFAs, as presented thus far, provide reliable protection against ret2usr attacks, only if the
attacker exploits a vulnerability that allows her to partially control a computed branch
target. However, vulnerabilities that allow overwriting kernel code pointers with arbitrary
values do exist [35]. When such flaws are present, ret2usr exploits could attempt to bypass
kGuard. This section discusses how kGuard defends itself against such threats.






























Figure 3.2: Subverting kGuard using bypass trampolines. CFA1 succeeds since the address
of the second branch (trampoline) is located in kernel space. CFA2 is completely bypassed
by jumping directly to the branch instruction.
3.2.2.1 Bypass Trampolines
To subvert kGuard, an attacker has to be able to determine the address of an indirect
branch instruction inside the .text segment of the kernel/modules. Moreover, she should
also be able to reliably control the value of its operand (branch target). We refer to that
branch instruction as bypass trampoline. Note that in ISAs with overlapping variable-length
instructions it is possible to find an embedded opcode sequence that translates directly to
a branch in user space [100]. By overwriting the target of a protected branch instruction
with the address of a bypass trampoline the attacker can successfully execute a jump to user
space, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. CFA1, corresponding to the initially exploited branch, will
succeed, since the address of the trampoline remains inside the privileged memory segment,
while CFA2, which guards the bypass trampoline, is completely bypassed by jumping directly
to the branch instruction.































Figure 3.3: Code inflation reshapes the .text area of the kernel/modules by inserting NOP
sleds of random length at the beginning of each CFA.
3.2.2.2 Code Diversification against Bypasses
kGuard implements two code diversification techniques that aid in thwarting attacks ex-
ploiting bypass trampolines.
1 Code Inflation. This technique reshapes the .text area of the kernel/modules,
as shown in Figure 3.3. We begin with randomizing the starting address of the .text
segment. This is achieved by inserting a NOP sled of random length at its beginning, which
effectively shifts all executable instructions by an arbitrary offset. Next, we continue with
inserting NOP sleds of random length at the beginning of each CFA. The end result is that
the location of every indirect control transfer instruction is randomized, forcing the attacker
to guess the (exact) address of a confined branch to use as a bypass trampoline. The effects
of the sleds are cumulative because each one pushes all instructions and NOP sleds following,
further to higher memory addresses. The size of the initial sled is chosen by kGuard based
on the target architecture. In Linux and {Free, Net}BSD the kernel space is at least 1GB,
and hence, we can achieve ≥ 20-bit of entropy without notably consuming address space.












































Figure 3.4: CFA motion. kGuard relocates each inline guard and protected branch, within
a certain window, by routinely rewriting the .text segment of the kernel/modules.
The size of the per-CFA NOP sled is randomly selected from a user-configured range. By
specifying the range, users can trade higher overhead (both in terms of space and speed), for
a smaller probability that an attacker can reliably obtain the address of a bypass trampoline.
An important assumption of the aforementioned technique is the secrecy of the kernel’s
image and symbols. If the attacker has access to the binary image of the protected kernel
or is armed with a kernel-level memory disclosure vulnerability [73, 198], the probability of
successfully guessing the address of a bypass trampoline increases. We posit that assigning
safe file permissions to the kernel’s image, modules, and debugging symbols is not a limiting
factor.2 In fact, this is considered standard practice in OS hardening, and is automatically
enabled in PaX and similar patches, as well as the latest Ubuntu Linux releases. Also note
that the kernel should harden access to the system message buffer (dmesg), in order to
prevent the leakage of kernel addresses.3
2This can be trivially achieved by changing the permissions in the file system to disallow reads, from
non-administrative users, in /boot and /lib/modules in Linux/FreeBSD, /bsd in OpenBSD, etc.
3In Linux this can be performed by asserting the kptr restrict [58] sysctl option, which hides exposed
kernel pointer addresses in /proc interfaces.
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2 CFA Motion. The basic idea behind this technique is the “continuous” relocation
of the protected branch instructions and injected guards, by rewriting the .text segment
of the kernel/modules. Figure 3.4 illustrates the concept. During compilation, kGuard
emits information regarding each injected CFA, which can be used later for relocating the
respective code snippets. Specifically, kGuard logs the exact location of the CFA inside
.text, the type and size of the guard, the length of the prepended NOP sled, as well as the
size of the branch instruction. Armed with that information, we can migrate every CFA
and indirect branch instruction separately, by moving them to a random location inside the
following window: sizeof(nop sled) + sizeof(cfa) + sizeof(branch).
Currently, our prototype implementation supports CFA motion during kernel bootstrap
only. In Linux, we perform the relocation at the end of the decompress kernel() rou-
tine [12], right before jumping to the main entry point of the (decompressed) ELF image.
In the BSDs, we do it after the boot program has been executed and right before transfer-
ring control to the machine-dependent initialization routines (mi startup() in FreeBSD;
main() in {Net, Open}BSD) [143]. Lastly, note that CFA motion can be performed at
runtime, on a live system, by trading runtime overhead for safety. In Section 3.6.1, we dis-
cuss how we can expand our current implementation, with moderate engineering effort, to
support real-time CFA migration, effectively creating a moving target for the attacker [126].
To further protect against evasion, kGuard can be combined with techniques that secure
kernel code against code-injection [129] and code-reuse attacks [1, 127, 159, 57]. That said,
note that ret2usr violations are detected at runtime. Hence, one failed attempt is enough to
identify the attacker and restrict her capabilities. In Section 3.5.2, we discuss how kGuard
can deal with persistent threats.
3.3 Implementation
We implemented kGuard as a set of modifications to the pipeline of a C compiler. Specifi-
cally, we instrument the intermediate representation (IR) used during the translation pro-
cess, in order to perform the CFA-based confinement discussed in Section 3.2. Our imple-
mentation consists of a plugin for the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC).



























Figure 3.5: Architectural overview of GCC. The compilation process involves 3 distinct
translators (frond-end, middle-end, back-end), and more than 250 optimization passes.
kGuard is implemented as a back-end optimization pass.
Starting with v4.5.1, GCC has been re-designed for facilitating better isolation between
its components, and allowing the use of plugins for dynamically adding features to transla-
tors without modifying them. Figure 3.5 illustrates the internal architecture of GCC. The
compilation pipeline consists of 3 distinct components, namely the front-end, middle-end,
and back-end, which transform the input into various IRs (i.e., GENERIC, GIMPLE, and
RTL). The kGuard plugin consists of ∼1000 lines of code in C and builds into a position-
independent (PIC) dynamic shared object that is loaded by GCC. Upon initializing kGuard,
the plugin manager of GCC invokes plugin init() (i.e., the initialization callback as-
sumed to be exported by every plugin), which parses the plugin arguments (if any) and
registers pass branchprot as a new “optimization” pass.4 Specifically, we chain our in-
strumentation callback, namely branchprot instrument(), after the vartrack RTL
optimization pass, by calling GCC’s register callback() function and requesting to
hook with the pass manager (see Figure 3.5).
4Currently, kGuard accepts 3 parameters: stub, nop, and log. stub provides the name of the runtime
violation handler, nop stores the maximum size of the random NOP sled inserted before each CFA, and log
is used to define an instrumentation logfile for CFA motion.
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The reasons for choosing to implement the instrumentation logic at the RTL level, and
not as annotations to the GENERIC or GIMPLE IR, are mainly the following. First,
by applying our assertions after most of the important optimizations have been performed,
which may result into moving or transforming instructions, we guarantee that we instrument
only relevant code. For instance, we do not inject CFAs for dead code or control-flow
transfers that, due to optimization transformations like inline expansion, do not need to
be confined. Second, we secure implicit control transfers that are exposed later in the
translation (e.g., after the High-GIMPLE IR has been “lowered”). Third, we tightly couple
the CFAs with the corresponding unsafe control-flow transfers. This way, we protect the
guards from being removed or shifted from the respective points of check, due to subsequent
optimization passes (e.g., code motion). For more information regarding the internals of
RTL instrumentation, interested readers are referred to Appendix B.
3.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the results from the evaluation of kGuard both in terms of perfor-
mance and effectiveness. Our testbed consisted of a single host, equipped with two 2.66GHz
quad-core Intel Xeon X5500 CPUs and 24GB of RAM, running Debian GNU/Linux v6
(“squeeze” with kernel v2.6.32). Note that while conducting our performance measure-
ments, the host was idle with no other user processes running apart from the evaluation
suite. Moreover, the results presented here are mean values, calculated after running 10
iterations of each experiment; the error bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
kGuard and the corresponding Linux kernels were compiled with GCC v4.5.1, and unless
otherwise noted, we used Debian’s default configuration that results into a complete build
of the kernel, including all modules and device drivers. Finally, we configured kGuard to use
a random NOP sled of maximum 32 (average 16) instructions. Note that we also measured
the effect of various NOP sled sizes, which was insignificant for the range 0 – 32.
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x86 kernel x86-64 kernel
call jmp ret call jmp ret
CFAM 20767 1803 17740 1732
CFAM(opt) 2253 12 113053 1789 0 105895
CFAR 6325 0 8780 0
Total 29345 1815 113053 28309 1732 105895
Table 3.2: Number of indirect branches instrumented by kGuard (Linux kernel v2.6.32.39).
3.4.1 Effectiveness
The main goal of the effectiveness evaluation is to apply kGuard on commodity OSes, and
determine whether it can detect and prevent real-life ret2usr attacks. Table 3.1 summarizes
our test suite, which consisted of a collection of 8 exploits from the Exploit Database
(EDB) [158] that cover a broad spectrum of different flaws, including direct NULL pointer
dereferences, control hijacking via tampered-with data structures (data pointer corruption),
function and data pointer overwrites, arbitrary kernel-memory (data) nullification, and
ret2usr via kernel stack-smashing.
We instrumented 10 different vanilla Linux kernels, ranging from v2.6.18 up to v2.6.34,
both in x86 and x86-64 architectures. Additionally, in this experiment, we used a home-
grown violation handler for demonstrating the customization features of kGuard. Upon the
detection of a ret2usr attack, the handler takes a snapshot of the memory that contains the
user-provided code for analyzing the behavior of the offending process. Such a feature could
be useful in a honeypot setup for performing malware analysis and studying new ret2usr
exploitation vectors. All kernels were compiled with and without kGuard, and tested against
the respective set of exploits. In every case, we were able to successfully detect and prevent
the corresponding exploitation attempt. Also note that the tested exploits circumvented
the page mapping restriction(s) that we discussed in Section 2.3.1 [208].
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3.4.2 Translation Overhead
We first quantify the additional time needed to inspect the RTL IR and emit the CFAs
(see Section 3.3). Specifically, we used the Unix time utility to measure the total build
time when compiling Linux kernel v2.6.32.39 natively and with kGuard. On average, we
observed a 0.3% increase on total build time on the x86 architecture, and 0.05% on x86-64.
Moreover, the size of the kernel image/modules increased by 3.5%/0.43% on the x86, and
5.6%/0.56% on the x86-64.
Table 3.2 shows the number of exploitable branches instrumented by kGuard, catego-
rized by architecture, and confinement and instruction type. As expected, ret instructions
dominate the computed branches. Note that both in x86 and x86-64 scenarios, we were
able to optimize approximately 10% of the total indirect calls via memory locations, using
the optimization scheme presented in Section 3.2.1. Overall, the drivers/ subsystem was
the one with the most instrumentations, followed by fs/, net/, and kernel/. Addition-
ally, a significant amount of instrumented branches was due to architecture-dependent code
(arch/) and “inlined” C functions (include/).
3.4.3 Performance Overhead
The injected CFAs introduce runtime latency. We evaluated kGuard to quantify this
overhead and establish a set of performance bounds for different types of system ser-
vices. Moreover, we used the overhead imposed by PaX (i.e., UDEREF [169, 170] and
KERNEXEC [171]) as reference. Recall that on x86, PaX offers protection against ret2usr
attacks by utilizing the segmentation unit for isolating the kernel from user space. In x86-64
CPUs, where segmentation is not supported by the hardware, it temporarily remaps user
space into a different (shadow) location with non-execute permissions.
3.4.3.1 Macro-Benchmarks
We begin with a set of real-life applications that represent different workloads. In particular,
we used a kernel build and two popular server applications: the Apache web server, which
performs mainly I/O; and the MySQL RDBMS that is both I/O driven and CPU intensive.
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We run all the respective tests over a vanilla Linux kernel (v2.6.32.39), and the same kernel
patched with PaX and instrumented with kGuard.
First, we measured the time taken to build a vanilla Linux kernel (v2.6.32.39), using the
Unix time utility. On the x86, the PaX-protected kernel incurs a 1.26% runtime overhead,
while on the x86-64 the overhead is 2.89%. In contrast, kGuard ranges between 0.93% on
x86-64, and 1.03% on x86. Next, we evaluated MySQL v5.1.49 using its own benchmark
suite (sql-bench). The suite consists of four different tests, which assess the completion
time of various DB operations, like table creation and modification, data selection and
insertion, etc. On average, the slowdown of kGuard ranges from 0.85% (x86-64) to 0.93%
(x86), while PaX lies between 1.16% (x86) and 2.67% (x86-64). Finally, we measured
Apache’s performance using its own utility ab and static HTML files of different size. We
used Apache v2.2.16 and configured it to pre-fork all the worker processes (pre-forking is a
standard multiprocessing module), in order to avoid high fluctuations in performance, due
to Apache spawning extra processes for handling the incoming requests at the beginning of
our experiments. We chose files with sizes of 1KB, 10KB, 100KB, and 1MB, and measured
the average throughput in requests per second (req/sec). All other options were left to
their default setting. The kernel patched with PaX incurs an average slowdown that ranges
between 0.01% and 0.09% on x86, and 0.01% and 1.07% on x86-64. In antithesis, kGuard
lies between 0.001% and 0.01%. Overall, our results indicate that in both x86 and x86-64
Linux the impact of kGuard on real-life applications is negligible (∼1%).
3.4.3.2 Micro-Benchmarks
We used the LMbench [144] microbenchmark suite to measure the impact of kGuard on
the performance of core kernel system calls and facilities. We focus on both latency and
bandwidth. For the first, we measured the latency of entering the OS, by investigating the
NULL system call (syscall) and the most frequently used I/O-related calls: read, write,
fstat, select, open/close. Additionally, we measured the time needed to install a
signal handler with sigaction, inter-process communication (IPC) latency with socket
and pipe, and process creation latency with fork+{exit, execve, /bin/sh}.






























































Figure 3.6: Latency overhead incurred by kGuard and PaX on essential system calls
(x86 Linux).
Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 summarize the latency overhead of kGuard in contrast to
the vanilla Linux kernel, and a kernel with the PaX patch applied and enabled. Note that
the time is measured in microseconds (µsec). kGuard ranges from 2.7% to 23.5% in x86
(average 11.4%), and 2.9% to 19.1% in x86-64 (average 10.3%). In contrast, the PaX-
protected kernel exhibits a latency ranging between 5.6% and 257% (average 84.5%) on
the x86, whereas on x86-64, the latency overhead ranges between 19% and 531% (average
172.2%). Additionally, the overhead of kGuard for process creation (in both architectures)
lies between 7.1% and 9.7%, whereas PaX ranges from 8.1% to 56.3%.
As far as bandwidth is concerned, we measured the degradation imposed by kGuard
and PaX in the maximum achieved bandwidth of popular IPC facilities, such as sockets
and pipes. Figure 3.8 shows our results (bandwidth is measured in MB/s). The slowdown
of kGuard ranges between 3.2% – 10% on x86 (average 6%), and 5.25% – 9.27% on x86-64
(average 6.6%). PaX lies between 19.9% – 58.8% on x86 (average 37%), and 21.7% – 78%
on x86-64 (average 42.8%).



























































Figure 3.7: Latency overhead incurred by kGuard and PaX on essential system calls
(x86-64 Linux).
Overall, kGuard exhibits lower overhead on x86-64, due to the fewer CFAM guards (see
Table 3.2)—CFAR confinement can be performed with just 3 additional instructions, and
hence incurs less runtime overhead; CFAM might need up to 10 instructions (e.g., when we
cannot optimize). However, the same is not true for PaX, as the lack of segmentation in
x86-64 results in higher performance penalty due to frequent page table manipulations.
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Custom Violation Handlers
The default violation handler of kGuard appends a message to the system log and halts the
OS. We coerce assertion violations into a kernel fail-stop to prevent brute-force attempts
against our code diversification schemes (code inflation, CFA motion; see Section 3.2.2.2),
and avoid leaving the OS in an inconsistent state (e.g., by aborting an in-flight kernel thread
that holds locks). Nonetheless, kGuard can be configured to use custom handlers.

























































Figure 3.8: IPC bandwidth achieved by kGuard and PaX, using TCP (PF INET), Unix
sockets (PF UNIX), and pipes.
Upon enabling this option, our confinement instrumentation becomes slightly different.
Instead of overwriting the computed branch target with the address of the default handler,
when a violation occurs, we push the offending target address to the stack and invoke the
custom handler directly. In the case of a CFAR this means that the mov instruction (see
Listing 3.1) is replaced by a push and call, as shown in Listing 3.6; CFAM guards are
modified accordingly. This instrumentation increases slightly the size of our guards, but
does not incur additional overhead, as the extra instruction is on the error path.
81 fb 00 00 00 c0 ; cmp $0xc0000000 ,%ebx
73 06 ; j a e c a l l l b l
53 ; push %ebx
e8 81 e6 0 f 00 ; c a l l 0 xc05a f8 f1
f f d3 ; c a l l l b l : c a l l ∗%ebx
Listing 3.6: Alternative CFAR applied on an indirect call in x86 Linux.
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The custom violation handler has access to the location where the violation occurred
(i.e., the failed CFA), by reading the return address of the callee (pushed to the stack from
call), as well as to the offending branch target (explicitly pushed to the stack by push).
Armed with that information, one can customize kGuard’s violation-handling policy and
implement adaptive defense mechanisms [87], like selective confinement (e.g., deal with
VMware’s I/O backdoor that needs to “violate” protection domains) and error virtualiza-
tion [196], or even perform forensic analyses (e.g., dump the exploit shellcode). The latter
can be useful in honeypot setups for studying new ret2usr exploitation vectors.
3.5.2 Persistent Threats
The violation-handling policy of kGuard can be tailored to need, by leveraging its ability
to support custom handlers. To that end, we developed a handler that actively responds
to persistent threats (e.g., users that try to brute-force the code diversification schemes of
kGuard by repeatedly attempting the bypass presented in Section 3.2.2.1).
Once invoked, due to a violation, this handler performs the following. First, it checks
the execution context of the kernel to identify if it runs inside a user-level process or an
interrupt handler. If the violation occurred while executing an interrupt service routine, or
if the current execution path is holding locks5, then it fail-stops the kernel. Else, if the kernel
is preemptible, it terminates all processes with the same uid with the offending process, and
prevents the user from logging in again (i.e., by disabling the respective account). Other
possible approaches include inserting an exponentially-increasing delay to user logins (i.e.,
make the brute-force attack slow and impractical), activate CFA motion, etc.
3.6 Future Work
3.6.1 Live CFA Motion
Currently, we investigate ways to apply the CFA motion technique (see Section 3.2.2.2),
while a kernel is running and the OS is live. To that end, we have crafted an early prototype,
5In Linux, we can easily check if a kernel control path is holding locks by looking at the value of the
preempt count variable [136].















Figure 3.9: Low-latency code inflation inserts “skip branches” before every NOP sled to
avoid executing the NOP instructions and directly transfer control to the CFA that follows.
which upon certain conditions, freezes the kernel and performs code (.text) rewriting.
Thus far, we have achieved CFA relocation in a coarse-grained manner, by exploiting the
stop machine facility of the Linux kernel [5]. Specifically, we bring the system to pre-
suspend state, preventing any kernel code from being invoked during the relocation phase.
Possible events to initiate live CFA motion are the number of executed system calls or
interrupts (i.e., diversify the kernel every N invocation events), CFA violations, or external
intrusion events (e.g., a ret2usr violation alert generated from a different system inside the
same security domain or “application community”) [134].
However, our end goal is to be able to perform CFA motion in a more fine-grained,
non-interruptible and efficient manner, without “locking” the whole OS. The Linux kernel
recently gained support for live kernel patching [53], through the kpatch [51] and kGraft [52]
projects. In the future, we plan to investigate whether mechanisms like the ones above can
provide the foundation for implementing dynamic code diversification schemes, such as live
CFA motion, without interrupting the normal operation of the kernel at all.
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3.6.2 Low-latency Code Inflation
In Section 3.4, among other things, we investigated the impact of code inflation on kernel
performance. Specifically, we measured the effect of different NOP sled sizes on system
latency, and observed negligible increase for the range 0 – 32. However, recall that the
maximum size of the NOP sleds is tunable (see Section 3.3; nop parameter). Hence, if
(significantly) larger sleds are used (e.g., 0 – 1024 or 0 – 4096), the overhead of code
inflation becomes noticeable, as the extra NOP instructions consume CPU cycles and their
impact on latency cannot be “masked” by the subsequent CFAs. Figure 3.9 sketches a
potential solution to this problem, which we plan to explore in the future. The main idea
is to prepend every NOP sled with a “skip branch” (i.e., a direct branch instruction) that
directly transfers control to the respective CFA and avoids executing the NOPs.
Availability
Our prototype implementation of kGuard is freely available, under the GNU General Public
License (v3) [81], at: https://www.cs.columbia.edu/˜vpk/research/kguard/.
Interested readers are referred to Appendix C for more information on how to use it.




Commodity OSes follow a design that weakly (asymmetrically) separates kernel from user
space, in favor of faster interactions between user processes and the kernel, as we discussed
in Chapter 2. The ret2usr protections outlined in Section 2.3, along with kGuard, aim to
alleviate this design weakness, and fortify kernel isolation with minimal overhead. In this
chapter, we seek to assess the security offered by these protections and investigate whether
certain performance-oriented design choices can render them ineffective.
Our findings indicate that there exist fundamental decisions, deeply rooted into the
architecture of the memory management (sub)system (mm) of modern OSes, which can
be abused for weakening the isolation between kernel and user space. We introduce a
novel kernel exploitation technique, named return-to-direct-mapped memory (ret2dir), which
allows an attacker to perform the equivalent of a ret2usr attack on a hardened system.
4.1.1 Threat Model
We assume a kernel hardened against ret2usr attacks using one (or a combination) of the
protection mechanisms discussed in Section 2.3, including kGuard. Moreover, we assume
an unprivileged attacker with local access to the OS, who seeks to elevate privileges by
exploiting a kernel-memory corruption vulnerability [36, 29, 41, 30, 44, 27, 23, 45, 43, 42,
34, 33, 32, 24, 39, 35, 40, 38] (see Section 2.2).
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We do not make any assumptions regarding the type of corrupted data; code and data
pointers are both possible targets [192, 79, 69, 80, 78, 77, 74]. Overall, the adversarial
capabilities we presume are identical to those needed for carrying out a ret2usr attack.
4.1.2 Attack Strategy
In a kernel hardened against ret2usr attacks, the hijacked control or data flow can no longer
be redirected to user space in a direct manner—the respective ret2usr protection scheme(s)
will block any such attempt, as shown in Figure 2.2. However, the implicit physical memory
sharing between user processes and the kernel allows an attacker to deconstruct the isolation
guarantees offered by ret2usr protection mechanisms, and redirect the kernel’s control or
data flow to user-controlled code or data.
A key facility that enables the implicit sharing of physical memory is physmap: a large,
contiguous virtual memory region inside kernel address space that contains a direct mapping
of part or all (depending on the architecture) physical memory. This region plays a crucial
role in enabling the kernel to allocate and manage dynamic memory, as fast as possible (we
discuss the structure of physmap in Section 4.2). We should stress that although in this
study we focus on Linux—one of the most widely used OSes—direct-mapped RAM regions
exist (in some form) in many OSes, as they are considered standard practice in physical
memory management. For instance, OpenBSD and Oracle Solaris use the seg kpm and
pmapmapping facility, respectively, to provide a direct mapping of the whole RAM in 64-bit
architectures [141, 162].
As physical memory is allotted to user processes and the kernel, the existence of physmap
results in address aliasing. Virtual address aliases, or synonyms [123], occur when two (or
more) different virtual addresses map to the same physical memory address. Given that
physmap maps a large part (or all) of physical memory within the kernel, the memory of
an attacker-controlled user process is accessible through its kernel-resident synonyms.
The first step in mounting a ret2dir attack is to map, in user space, the exploit pay-
load. Depending on whether the exploited vulnerability enables the corruption of a code
pointer [192, 79, 69, 80, 78, 77, 74] or a data pointer [76, 73, 72], the payload will consist of
either shellcode, or controlled (tampered-with) data structures, as shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Overall ret2dir operation. The physmap (direct-mapped RAM) area enables
a hijacked kernel code or data pointer to access user-controlled data, without crossing the
user-kernel space boundary.
Whenever the mm (sub)system allocates (dynamic) memory to user space, it defers giving
page frames until the very last moment. Specifically, physical memory is granted to user
processes in a lazy manner, using the demand paging and copy-on-write methods [13],
which both rely on page faults to actually allocate RAM. When the content of the payload
is initialized, the MMU generates a page fault, and the kernel allocates a page frame to the
attacking process. Page frames are typically managed by mm using a buddy allocator [122].
Given the existence of physmap, the moment the buddy allocator provides a page frame
to be mapped in user space, mm effectively creates an alias of the exploit payload in kernel
space, as shown in Figure 4.1. Although the kernel never uses such synonyms directly, mm
keeps the whole RAM pre-mapped in order to boost page frame reclamation. This allows
newly deallocated page frames to be made available to the kernel instantly, without the
need to alter page tables (see Section 4.2.1 for more details).
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Overall, ret2dir takes advantage of the implicit data sharing between user and kernel
space (due to physmap) to redirect a hijacked kernel control or data flow to a set of kernel-
resident synonym pages, effectively performing the equivalent of a ret2usr attack without
reaching out to user space. It is important to note that the malicious payload “emerges”
in kernel space the moment a page frame is given to the attacking process. The attacker
does not have to explicitly “push” (copy) the payload to kernel space (e.g., via pipes or
message queues), as physmap makes it readily available. The use of such methods is also
much less flexible, as the system imposes strict limits to the amount of memory that can
be allocated for kernel-resident buffers, while the exploit payload will (most likely) have to
be encapsulated in certain kernel data objects that can affect its structure.
4.2 Demystifying physmap
A critical first step in understanding the mechanics of ret2dir attacks is to take a look at
how kernel address space is organized internally; we use the Linux x86/x86-64 platform as
reference. The x86-64 architecture uses 48-bit virtual addresses that are sign-extended to
64 bits (i.e., bits [48:63] are copies of bit [47]). This scheme natively splits the 64-bit
virtual address space in two canonical halves of 128TB each. As shown in Figure 4.2a, kernel
space occupies the upper half (0xFFFF800000000000 – 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF), and is
further divided into six regions [120]: the fixmap area, modules, kernel image, vmemmap
space, vmalloc arena, and physmap. In x86, on the other hand, the kernel space can be
assigned to the upper 1GB, 2GB, or 3GB part of the address space, with the first option
being the default. As kernel virtual address space is limited, it can become a scarce resource,
and certain regions collide to prevent its waste (e.g., modules and vmalloc arena, kernel
image and physmap; see Figure 4.2b).1 For the purposes of ret2dir, in the following, we
focus only on the direct-mapped region.
1To access the contents of a page frame, the kernel must first map that frame in kernel space. In x86,
however, the kernel has only 1GB – 3GB virtual addresses available for managing (up to) 64GB of RAM.
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(a) x86-64 (b) x86
Figure 4.2: The internal layout of Linux kernel space in (a) x86-64 and (b) x86 (as of kernel
version 3.12). In x86-64, the kernel space is further divided in six distinct regions, namely
fixmap, modules, kernel image, vmemmap space, vmalloc arena, and physmap. In x86,
where kernel addresses are a scarce resource, the distinct regions are only four; some of
them collide to reduce space waste (i.e., modules and vmalloc arena, kernel image and
physmap). What is important to note, however, is that in both architectures there exists a
direct mapping of all (or part of) RAM inside kernel space at a fixed location (values shown
for the default 3G/1G user/kernel split).
4.2.1 Functionality
The physmap area is a mapping of paramount importance to the performance of the kernel,
as it facilitates dynamic kernel memory allocation. At a high level, mm offers two main
methods for requesting memory: vmalloc and kmalloc. With the vmalloc family of
routines, memory can only be allocated in multiples of page size and is guaranteed to be
virtually contiguous but not physically contiguous. In contrast, with the kmalloc family
of routines, memory can be allocated in byte-level chunks, and is guaranteed to be both
virtually and physically contiguous.
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As it offers memory only in page multiples, vmalloc leads to higher internal memory
fragmentation and often poor cache performance. More importantly, vmalloc needs to
alter the page tables of the kernel every time memory is (de)allocated to map or unmap
the respective page frames to or from the vmalloc arena. (see Figure 4.2). This not
only incurs additional overhead, but results in increased TLB thrashing [136]. For these
reasons, the majority of kernel components use kmalloc; the use of vmalloc is limited to
performance-insensitive tasks, such as module loading. However, given that kmalloc can
be invoked from any context, including that of interrupt service routines, which have strict
timing constraints, it must satisfy a multitude of different (and contradicting) requirements.
In certain contexts, the allocator should never sleep (e.g., when locks are held). In other
cases, it should never fail, or it should return memory that is guaranteed to be physically
contiguous (e.g., when a device driver reserves memory for DMA).
Given constraints like the above, physmap is a necessity, as the main facilitator of
optimal performance. The mm developers opted for a design that lays kmalloc over a
region2 that pre-maps the entire RAM (or part of it) for the following reasons [13]. First,
kmalloc (de)allocates memory without touching the page table(s) of the kernel. This
not only reduces TLB pressure significantly, but also removes high-latency operations, like
page table manipulation and TLB shootdowns [141], from the fast path. Second, the linear
mapping of page frames results in virtual memory that is guaranteed, by design, to be always
physically contiguous. This leads to increased cache performance, and has the added benefit
of allowing drivers to directly assign kmalloc’ed regions to DMA devices that can only
operate on physically contiguous memory (e.g., when there is no IOMMU support). Finally,
page frame accounting is greatly simplified, as address translations (virtual-to-physical and
vice versa) can be performed using solely arithmetic operations [125].
2kmalloc is not directly layered over physmap. It is instead implemented as a collection of geometrically
distributed (32B–4KB) slabs, which are in turn placed over physmap. The slab layer is a hierarchical, type-
based data structure caching scheme. By taking into account certain factors, such as page and object sizes,
cache line information, and memory access times (in NUMA systems), it can perform intelligent allocation
choices that minimize memory fragmentation and make the best use of a system’s cache hierarchy. Linux
adopted the slab allocator of SunOS [11], and as of kernel v3.12, it supports three variants: SLAB, SLUB
(default), and SLOB.
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Architecture PHYS OFFSET Size Prot.
x86 (3G/1G) 0xC0000000 891MB RW
(2G/2G) 0x80000000 1915MB RW
(1G/3G) 0x40000000 2939MB RW
AArch32 (3G/1G) 0xC0000000 760MB RWX
(2G/2G) 0x80000000 1784MB RWX
(1G/3G) 0x40000000 2808MB RWX
x86-64 0xFFFF880000000000 64TB RW(X)
AArch64 0xFFFFFFC000000000 256GB RWX
Table 4.1: The characteristics of physmap in Linux (x86, x86-64, AArch32, AArch64).
4.2.2 Location and Size
The physmap region is an architecture-independent feature (this should come as no surprise
given the reasons we outlined above) that exists in all popular Linux platforms. Depending
on the memory addressing characteristics of each ISA, the size of physmap and its exact
location may differ. Nonetheless, in all cases: (i) there exists a direct mapping of part or
all physical memory in kernel space, and (ii) the mapping starts at a fixed, known location.
The latter is true even in the case where kernel-space ASLR (KASLR) [68] is employed.
Table 4.1 lists the properties of physmap for the platforms we consider. In x86-64
systems, physmapmaps directly, in a 1:1 manner, starting from page frame zero, the entire
RAM of the system into a 64TB region. AArch64 systems use a 256GB region for the same
purpose [139]. Conversely, in x86 systems, the kernel directly maps only a portion of RAM.
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The size of physmap on 32-bit architectures depends on two factors: (i) the user/kernel
split used (3G/1G, 2G/2G, or 1G/3G), and (ii) the size of the vmalloc arena. Under
the default setting, in which 1GB is assigned to kernel space and the vmalloc arena
occupies 120MB, the size of physmap is 891MB (1GB - sizeof(vmalloc + pkmap +
fixmap + unused)) and starts at 0xC0000000. Likewise, under a 2G/2G (1G/3G)
split, physmap starts at 0x80000000 (0x40000000) and spawns 1915MB (2939MB).
The situation in AArch32 is quite similar [118], with the only difference being the default
size of the vmalloc arena (240MB).
Overall, in 32-bit systems, the amount of directly mapped physical memory depends on
the size of RAM and physmap. If sizeof(physmap) ≥ sizeof(RAM), then the entire
RAM is direct-mapped—a common case for 32-bit mobile devices with up to 1GB of RAM.
Otherwise, only sizeof(physmap)/sizeof(PAGE SZ) pages are mapped directly.
4.2.3 Access Rights
A crucial aspect for mounting a ret2dir attack is the memory access rights of physmap. To
get the protection bits of the kernel pages that correspond to the direct-mapped memory
region, we built kptdump:3 a utility in the form of a kernel module that exports page
tables through the debugfs pseudo-filesystem [47]. The tool traverses the kernel page
table, available via the global symbols swapper pg dir (x86/AArch32/AArch64) and
init level4 pgt (x86-64), and dumps the flags (U/S, R/W, XD) of every kernel page that
falls within the physmap region.
In x86, physmap is mapped as “readable and writeable” (RW) in all kernel versions
we tried (the oldest one was v2.6.32, released on Dec. 2009). In x86-64, however, the
permissions of physmap are not in sane state. Kernels up to v3.8.13 violate the WˆX
property by mapping the entire region as “readable, writeable, and executable” (RWX)—
only very recent kernels (≥ v3.9) use the conservative RW mapping. AArch32 and AArch64
map physmap with RWX permissions in every kernel version we tested (up to v3.12).
3
kptdump resembles the functionality of Arjan van de Ven’s patch [211]; we had to resort to a custom
solution, as that patch is only available for x86/x86-64 and cannot be used “as-is” in any other architecture.
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4.3 Locating Synonyms
The final piece for mounting a ret2dir exploit is finding a way to reliably pinpoint the
location of a synonym address in the physmap area, given its user-space counterpart. For
legacy environments, in which physmap maps only part of the system’s physical memory,
such as a 32-bit system with 8GB of RAM, an additional requirement is to ensure that the
synonym of a user-space address of interest exists.
We have developed two techniques for achieving both goals. The first relies on page
frame information available through the pagemap interface of the /proc filesystem, which
is currently accessible by non-privileged users in all Linux distributions we studied. As
the danger of ret2dir attacks will (hopefully) encourage system administrators and Linux
distributions to disable access to pagemap, we have developed a second technique that does
not rely on any kernel information leakage.
4.3.1 Leaking PFNs (via /proc)
The procfs pseudo-filesystem [117] has a long history of leaking information that is
security-sensitive [165, 103, 189]. Starting with kernel v2.6.25 (Apr. 2008), a set of pseudo-
files, including /proc/<pid>/pagemap, were added in /proc to enable the examination
of page tables for debugging purposes. To assess the prevalence of this facility, we tested
the latest releases of the most popular distributions according to DistroWatch [65] (i.e.,
Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, and CentOS). In all cases, pagemap was enabled by default.
For every user-space page, pagemap provides a 64-bit value, indexed by (virtual) page
number, which contains information regarding the presence of the page in RAM [132]. If
a page is present in RAM, then bit [63] is set and bits [0:54] encode its page frame
number (PFN). That being so, the PFN of a given user-space virtual address uaddr, can
be located by opening /proc/<pid>/pagemap and reading eight bytes from file offset
(uaddr/PAGE SZ) * sizeof(uint64 t) (assuming PAGE SZ = 4KB).
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Armed with the PFN of a given uaddr, denoted as PFN(uaddr), its synonym in
physmap, SYN(uaddr), can be located using the following formula:
SYN(uaddr) = PHYS OFFSET + PAGE SZ * (PFN(uaddr) - PFN MIN) (4.1)
PHYS OFFSET corresponds to the known, fixed starting virtual address of physmap
(values for different configurations are shown in Table 4.1), and PFN MIN is the first page
frame number—in many architectures, including ARM, physical memory starts from a
non-zero offset (e.g., 0x60000000 in Versatile Express ARM boards, which corresponds
to PFN MIN = 0x60000). To prevent SYN(uaddr) from being reclaimed (e.g., after
swapping out uaddr), the respective user page(s) can be “pinned” to RAM using mlock.
4.3.1.1 sizeof(RAM) > sizeof(physmap)
For systems in which part of RAM is direct-mapped, only a subset of PFNs is accessible
through physmap. For instance, in an x86 system with 4GB of RAM, the PFN range is
0x0–0x100000. However, under the default 3G/1G split, the physmap region maps only
the first 891MB of RAM (see Table 4.1 for alternative configurations), which means PFNs
from 0x0 up to 0x37B00 (PFN MAX). If the PFN of a user-space address is greater than
PFN MAX (the PFN of the last direct-mapped page), then physmap does not contain a
synonym for that address. Naturally, the question that arises is whether we can force the
buddy allocator to provide page frames with PFNs less than PFN MAX.
For compatibility reasons, mm splits physical memory into several zones. In particular,
DMA processors of older ISA buses can only address the first 16MB of RAM, while some PCI
DMA peripherals can access only the first 4GB. To cope with such limitations, mm supports
the following zones: ZONE DMA, ZONE DMA32, ZONE NORMAL, and ZONE HIGHMEM. The
latter is available in 32-bit platforms and contains the page frames that cannot be directly
addressed by the kernel (i.e., those that are not mapped in physmap). ZONE NORMAL
contains page frames above ZONE DMA (and ZONE DMA32, in 64-bit systems) and below
ZONE HIGHMEM. When only part of RAM is direct-mapped, mm orders the zones as follows:
ZONE HIGHMEM > ZONE NORMAL > ZONE DMA.
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Given a page frame request, mm will try to satisfy it starting with the highest zone that
complies with the request (e.g., the direct-mapped memory of ZONE NORMAL is preferred for
kmalloc), moving towards lower zones as long as there are no free page frames available.
From the attacker’s perspective, user processes get their page frames from ZONE HIGH-
MEM first, as mm tries to preserve the page frames that are direct-mapped for dynamic
memory requests from the kernel. However, when the page frames of ZONE HIGHMEM are
depleted, due to increased memory pressure, mm inevitably starts providing page frames from
ZONE NORMAL or ZONE DMA. Based on this, our strategy is as follows.
The attacking process repeatedly uses mmap to request memory. For each page in the
requested memory region, the process causes a page fault by accessing a single byte, forcing
mm to allocate a page frame (alternatively, the MAP POPULATE flag in mmap can be used
to pre-allocate all the respective page frames). The process then checks the PFN of every
allocated page, and the same procedure is repeated until a PFN less than PFN MAX is
obtained. The synonym of such a page is then guaranteed to be present in physmap, and
its exact address can be calculated using formula 4.1. Note that depending on the size of
physical memory and the user/kernel split used, we may have to spawn additional processes
to completely deplete ZONE HIGHMEM. For example, on an x86 machine with 8GB of RAM
and the default 3G/1G split, up to three processes might be necessary to guarantee that
a page frame that falls within physmap will be acquired. Interestingly, the more benign
processes are running on the system, the easier it is for an attacker to acquire a page
with a synonym in physmap. The additional tasks create memory pressure, “pushing” the
allocations of the attacker to the desired zones.
4.3.1.2 Contiguous synonyms
Certain exploits require more than a single page for their payload(s). Pages that are virtually
contiguous in user space, however, do not necessarily map to page frames that are physically
contiguous, which means that their synonyms will not be contiguous either. Yet, given
physmap’s linear mapping, two pages with consecutive synonyms have PFNs that are
sequential. Therefore, if 0xBEEF000 and 0xFEEB000 have PFNs 0x2E7C2 and 0x2E7C3,
respectively, then they are contiguous in physmap despite being ∼64MB apart in user space.
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To identify consecutive synonyms, we proceed as follows. Using the same methodology
as above, we compute the synonym of a random user page. We then repeatedly obtain more
synonyms, each time comparing the PFN of the newly acquired synonym with the PFNs
of those previously retrieved. The process continues until any two (or more, depending
on the exploit) synonyms have sequential PFNs. The exploit payload can then be split
appropriately across the user pages that correspond to synonyms with sequential PFNs.
4.3.2 physmap Spraying
As eliminating access to /proc/<pid>/pagemap is a rather simple task, we also consider
the case in which PFN information is not available. In such a setting, given a user page that
is present in RAM, there is no direct way of determining the location of its synonym inside
physmap. Recall that our goal is to identify a kernel-resident page in the physmap area
that “mirrors” a user-resident exploit payload. Although we cannot pinpoint the synonym
of a given user address, it is still possible to proceed in the opposite direction: pick an
arbitrary physmap address, and ensure (to the extent possible) that its corresponding page
frame is mapped by a user page that contains the exploit payload.
This can be achieved by exhausting the address space of the attacking process with
(aligned) copies of the exploit payload, in a way similar to heap spraying [64]. The base
address and length of the physmap area is known in advance (Table 4.1). The latter
corresponds to PFN MAX− PFN MIN page frames, shared among all user processes and the
kernel. If the attacking process manages to copy the exploit payload into Nmemory-resident
pages (in the physical memory range mapped by physmap), then the probability (Psucc)
that an arbitrarily chosen, page-aligned physmap address will map the exploit payload is:
Psucc =
N
PFN MAX− PFN MIN
(4.2)
Our goal is to maximize Psucc.
4.3.2.1 Spraying
Maximizing N is straightforward and boils down to acquiring as many page frames as pos-
sible. The technique we use is similar to the one presented in Section 4.3.1.
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The attacking process repeatedly acquires memory using mmap and “sprays” the ex-
ploit payload into the returned regions. We prefer using mmap, over ways that involve
shmget, brk, and remap file pages, due to system limits typically imposed on the lat-
ter. MAP ANONYMOUS allocations are also preferred, as existing file-backed mappings (from
competing processes) will be swapped out with higher priority compared to anonymous
mappings. The copying of the payload causes page faults that result in page frame alloca-
tions by mm (alternatively MAP POPULATE can be used). If the virtual address space is not
enough for depleting the entire RAM, as is the case with certain 32-bit configurations, the
attacking process must spawn additional child processes to assist with the allocations.
The procedure continues until mm starts swapping “sprayed” pages to disk. To pinpoint
the exact moment that swapping occurs, each attacking process checks periodically if its
sprayed pages are still resident in physical memory, by calling the getrusage system
call every few mmap invocations. At the same time, all attacking processes start a set
of background threads that repeatedly write-access the already allocated pages, emulating
the behavior of mlock, and preventing (to the extent possible) sprayed pages from being
swapped out—mm swaps page frames to disk using the LRU policy. Hence, by accessing
pages repeatedly, mm is tricked to believe that they correspond to fresh content. When the
number of memory-resident pages begins to drop (i.e., the resident-set size (RSS) of the
attacking process(es) starts decreasing), the maximum allowable physical memory footprint
has been reached. Of course, the size of this footprint also depends on the memory load
inflicted by other processes, which compete with the attacking processes for RAM.
4.3.2.2 Signatures
As far as PFN MAX− PFN MIN is concerned, we can reduce the set of potential target pages
in the physmap region, by excluding certain pages that correspond to frames that the
buddy allocator will never provide to user space. For example, in x86 and x86-64, the
BIOS typically stores the hardware configuration detected during POST at page frame
zero. Likewise, the physical address range 0xA0000–0xFFFFF is reserved for mapping the
internal memory of certain graphics cards.
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In addition, the ELF sections of the kernel image that correspond to kernel code and
global data are loaded at known, fixed locations in RAM (e.g., 0x1000000 in x86). Based
on these and other predetermined allocations, we have generated physmap signatures of
reserved page frame ranges for each configuration we consider. If a signature is not available,
then all page frames are potential targets. By combining physmap spraying and signatures,
we can maximize the probability that our informed selection of an arbitrary page from
physmap will point to the exploit payload. Specifically, the results of our experimental
security evaluation (Section 4.6.2) show that, depending on the configuration, Psucc can be
as high as 96%.
4.4 Putting Everything Together
4.4.1 Bypassing SMAP, PAN, and UDEREF
We begin with an example of a ret2dir attack against an x86 system hardened with SMAP
or UDEREF (PAN operates similarly to UDEREF). We assume an exploit for a kernel
vulnerability that allows us to corrupt a kernel data pointer, named kdptr, and overwrite it
with an arbitrary value [76, 73, 72]. On a system with an unhardened kernel, an attacker can
overwrite kdptrwith a user-space address, and force the kernel to dereference it by invoking
the appropriate interface (e.g., a buggy system call). However, the presence of SMAP
or UDEREF will cause a memory access violation, effectively blocking the exploitation
attempt. To overcome this, a ret2dir attack can be mounted as follows.
First, an attacker-controlled user process reserves a single page (4KB), say at address
0xBEEF000. Next, the process moves on to initialize the newly allocated memory with the
exploit payload (e.g., a tampered-with data structure). This payload initialization phase
will cause a page fault, triggering mm to request a free page frame from the buddy allocator
and map it at address 0xBEEF000. Suppose that the buddy system picks page frame 1904
(0x770). In x86, under the default 3G/1G split, physmap starts at 0xC0000000, which
means that the page frame has been pre-mapped at address 0xC0000000 + (4096 ∗
0x770) = 0xC0770000 (according to formula 4.1).
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At this point, 0xBEEF000 and 0xC0770000 are synonyms; they both map to the
physical page that contains the attacker’s payload. Consequently, any data in the area
0xBEEF000–0xBEEFFFFF is readily accessible by the kernel through the synonym ad-
dresses 0xC0770000–0xC0770FFF. To make matters worse, given that physmap is pri-
marily used for implementing dynamic memory, the kernel cannot distinguish whether the
kernel data structure located at address 0xC0770000 is fake or legitimate (i.e., properly
allocated using kmalloc). Therefore, by overwriting kdptr with 0xC0770000 (instead of
0xBEEF000), the attacker can bypass SMAP and UDEREF, as both protections consider
benign any dereference of memory addresses above 0xC0000000.
4.4.2 Bypassing SMEP, PXN, KERNEXEC, and kGuard
We use a running example from the x86-64 architecture to demonstrate how a ret2dir attack
can bypass KERNEXEC, kGuard, and SMEP (PXN operates almost identically to SMEP).
We assume the exploitation of a kernel vulnerability that allows the corruption of a kernel
function pointer, namely kfptr, with an arbitrary value [80, 78, 77, 74]. In this setting,
the exploit payload is not a set of fake data structures, but machine code (shellcode) to
be executed with elevated privilege. In real-world kernel exploits, the payload typically
consists of a multi-stage shellcode, the first stage of which stitches together kernel routines
(second stage) for performing privilege escalation [201]. In most cases, this boils down to
executing something similar to commit creds(prepare kernel cred(NULL)). These
two routines replace the credentials ((e)uid, (e)gid) of a user task with zero, effectively
granting root privileges to the attacking process.
The procedure is similar as in the previous example. Suppose that the payload has
been copied to user-space address 0xBEEF000, which the buddy allocator assigned to page
frame 190402 (0x2E7C2). In x86-64, physmap starts at 0xFFFF880000000000 (see
Table 4.1), and maps the whole RAM using regular pages (4KB). Hence, according to
formula 4.1, a synonym of address 0xBEEF000 is located within kernel space at address
0xFFFF880000000000 + (4096 ∗ 0x2E7C2) = 0xFFFF87FF9F080000.
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In ret2usr scenarios where attackers control a kernel function pointer, an advantage is
that they also control the memory access rights of the user page(s) that contain the exploit
payload, making it trivially easy to mark the shellcode as executable. In a hardened system,
however, a ret2dir attack allows controling only the content of the respective synonym pages
within physmap—not their permissions. In other words, although the attacker can set the
permissions of the range 0xBEEF000 – 0xBEEFFFF, this will not affect the access rights
of the corresponding physmap pages.
Unfortunately, as shown in Table 4.1, the WˆX property is not enforced in many plat-
forms, including x86-64. In our example, the content of user address 0xBEEF000 is
also accessible through kernel address 0xFFFF87FF9F080000 as plain, executable code.
Therefore, by simply overwriting kfptr with 0xFFFF87FF9F080000 and triggering the
kernel to dereference it, an attacker can directly execute shellcode with kernel privilege.
KERNEXEC, kGuard, and SMEP (PXN) cannot distinguish whether kfptr points to ma-
licious code or a legitimate kernel routine, and as long as kfptr ≥ 0xFFFF880000000000
and *kfptr is RWX, the dereference is considered benign.
4.4.2.1 Non-executable physmap
In the example above, we take advantage of the fact that some platforms map part (or all)
of the physmap region as executable (X). The question that arises is whether ret2dir can
be effective when physmap has sane permissions. As we demonstrate in Section 4.6.1, even
in this case, ret2dir attacks are still possible through the use of ROP [100, 195, 17].
Let’s revisit the previous example, this time under the assumption that physmap is not
executable. Instead of mapping regular shellcode at 0xBEEF000, an attacker can map an
equivalent ROP payload: a sequence of control and regular data that stitch together a chain
of code fragments ending with ret instructions, known as gadgets. Gadgets are located
in the kernel’s (executable) .text segment, and perform a semantically equivalent compu-
tation with the regular shellcode (e.g., commit creds(prepare kernel cred(NULL)).
To trigger the ROP chain, kfptr is overwritten with an address that points to a stack
pivoting gadget [187, 198], which is needed to set the stack pointer to the beginning of the
ROP payload, so that each gadget can transfer control to the next one.
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By overwriting kfptr with the address of a pivot sequence, like xchg %rax, %rsp;
ret (assuming that %rax points to 0xFFFF87FF9F080000), the synonym of the ROP
payload now acts as a kernel-mode stack. Note that Linux allocates a separate kernel
stack for every user thread using kmalloc, making it impossible to differentiate between a
legitimate stack and a ROP payload “pushed” in kernel space using ret2dir, as both reside
in physmap. Finally, the ROP code should also take care of restoring the stack pointer
(and possibly other CPU registers) to allow for reliable kernel continuation [4, 173].
4.5 Implementation
We have implemented the techniques presented in the previous sections under a common
framework for the development of ret2dir exploits. Our implementation is readily avail-
able as a shared library, called libret2dir, and provides support for x86/x86-64 and
AArch32/AArch64 Linux architectures (additional targets can be added with moderate
engineering effort). libret2dir can be used to aid the development of kernel exploits
against ret2usr-hardened targets, by automating the process of injecting the exploit pay-
load in kernel space. In addition, it can be used to convert existing ret2usr exploits to
ret2dir-equivalents with minimal effort.
The core part of the API provided by libret2dir consists of the following functions:
int ret2dir_init();
caddr_t ret2dir_get(size_t &pnum);
int ret2dir_map(void *src, size_t len);
At first, the library has to be initialized by invoking ret2dir init. This function launches
a discovery phase for determining the features of the target platform that are of interest
for ret2dir, such as PHYS OFFSET, PFN MAX, PFN MIN, the user/kernel split used (32-
bit architectures only), etc. At this stage, libret2dir also checks whether pagemap
is accessible through /proc. If it is available, then libret2dir uses the PFN leaking
technique to locate synonyms. Otherwise, it falls back to the page frame spraying method.
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Once the library is initialized, there are two principal methods that an exploit writer
can use: get and map. The former is implemented by ret2dir get, which requests pnum
contiguous pages in physmap. If pagemap is available, then the technique presented in
Section 4.3.1 is used for obtaining up to pnum contiguous synonym pages (the number of
actual pages obtained is returned back via pnum); synonyms are internally represented in
the form of (uaddr, kaddr) pairs. After locating the synonyms, ret2dir get returns
kaddr base, which is the base address of the contiguous kernel-space synonyms. The
exploit writer can assume that the payload will be available at [kaddr base:kaddr base
+ (pnum * PAGE SZ) - 1], and use addresses from this region (instead of user-space
addresses) when corrupting kernel data or code poiners. If pagemap is not available, then
libret2dir randomly selects a page-aligned address from within the physmap region,
by taking into consideration the appropriate physmap signature (if available), and returns
that as kaddr base. Note that in this case, only a single page is reserved (pnum = 1).
Armed with the address of the synonym in kernel space, the exploit writer can now
proceed to prepare the payload, which is typically position-dependent (especially in the
case of ROP code). Once ready, ret2dir map can be used to inject the payload in kernel
space. The exploit writer provides a pointer to the beginning of the payload along with its
size. If pagemap is available, libret2dir makes the payload available at kaddr base,
by copying it in to the appropriate user-space locations (i.e., uaddr instances), recorded
during the invocation of ret2dir get. Otherwise, it begins the page frame spraying
process, as described in Section 4.3.2, with the hope that at the end of it kaddr base will
map to an instance of the “sprayed” payload.
4.6 Evaluation
4.6.1 Effectiveness
We evaluated the effectiveness of ret2dir against kernels hardened with ret2usr protec-
tions, using real-world and custom exploits. We obtained a set of 8 ret2usr exploits from
EDB [158], covering a wide range of kernel versions (v2.6.33.6–v3.8). We ran every exploit
on an unhardened kernel to verify that works and follows a ret2usr exploitation approach.
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Next, we repeated the same experiment with every kernel hardened against ret2usr
attacks, and, as expected, all exploits failed. Finally, we transformed the exploits into
ret2dir-equivalents, using libret2dir (Section 4.5), and used them against the same
hardened systems. Overall, our ret2dir versions of the exploits bypassed all available ret2usr
protections, namely SMEP, SMAP, PXN, KERNEXEC, UDEREF, and kGuard.4
Table 4.2 summarizes our findings. The first two columns (EDB-ID and CVE) corre-
spond to the tested exploit, and the third (Arch.) and fourth (Kernel) denote the archi-
tecture and kernel version used. The Payload column indicates the type of payload pushed
in kernel space using ret2dir, which can be: a ROP payload (ROP), executable instructions
(SHELLCODE), tampered-with data structures (STRUCT), or a combination of the above,
depending on the exploit. The Protection column lists the deployed protection mechanisms
in each case. Empty cells correspond to protections that are not applicable in the given
setup, because they may not be: (i) available for a particular architecture, (ii) supported
by a given kernel version, (iii) relevant against certain types of exploits. For instance, PXN
is available only in ARM architectures [131], while SMEP and SMAP are Intel processor
features [88, 55]. Furthermore, support for SMEP was added in kernel v3.5 [220] and for
SMAP in v3.7 [50]. Note that depending on the permissions of the physmap area (see
Table 4.1), we had to modify some exploits that relied on plain shellcode to use a ROP
payload, in order to achieve arbitrary code execution (while in ret2usr exploits attackers
can give executable permissions to the user-space memory that contains the payload, in
ret2dir exploits it is not possible to modify the permissions of physmap).5 Entries for
kGuard marked with * require access to the (randomized) .text segment of the kernel.
As we mentioned in Section 2.3, KERNEXEC and UDEREF were recently ported to
the AArch32 architecture [200]. In addition to providing stronger address space separation,
the authors made an effort to fix the permissions of the kernel in AArch32, by enforcing
the WˆX property for the majority of RWX pages in physmap.
4At the time of writting, we did not have access to a CPU (or CPU emulator) that supported PAN.
5Exploit 15285 uses ROP code to bypass KERNEXEC/UDEREF and plain shellcode to evade kGuard.
Exploit 26131 uses ROP code in x86 (kernel v3.5) to bypass KERNEXEC/UDEREF and SMEP/SMAP,
and plain shellcode in x86-64 (kernel v3.8) to bypass kGuard, KERNEXEC, and SMEP.
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However, as the respective patch is currently under development, there still exist regions
inside physmap that are mapped as RWX. In kernel v3.8.7, we identified a ∼6MB physmap
region mapped as RWX that enabled the execution of plain shellcode in our ret2dir exploit.
The most recent kernel version for which we found a publicly-available exploit is v3.8.
Thus, to evaluate the latest kernel series (v3.12) we used a custom exploit. We artificially
injected two vulnerabilities that allowed us to corrupt a kernel data or function pointer,
and overwrite it with a user-controlled value (marked as “Custom” in Table 4.2). Note
that both flaws are similar to those exploited by the publicly-available exploits. Regarding
ARM, the most recent PaX-protected AArch32 kernel that we managed to boot was v3.8.7.
We tested every applicable protection for each exploit. In all cases, the ret2dir versions
transfered control solely to kernel addresses, bypassing all deployed protections. Figure 4.3
depicts the shellcode we used in x86-64 and AArch32 architectures. The shellcode is relocat-
able, so the only change needed in each exploit is to to replace pkcred and ccreds with
the addresses of prepare kernel cred and commit creds, respectively, as discussed
in Section 4.4.2. By copying the shellcode into a user-space page that has a synonym in the
physmap area, we can directly execute it from kernel mode by overwriting a kernel code
pointer with the physmap-resident synonym address of the user-space page. We followed
this strategy for all cases in which physmap was mapped as executable (corresponding to
the entries of Table 4.2 that contain SHELLCODE in the Payload column).
For cases in which physmap is non-executable, we substituted the shellcode with a
ROP payload that achieves the same purpose. In those cases, the corrupted kernel code
pointer is overwritten with the address of a stack pivoting gadget, which brings the kernel’s
stack pointer to the physmap page that is a synonym for the user page that contains the
ROP payload. Figure 4.4 shows an example of an x86 ROP payload used in our exploits.
The first gadgets preserve the %esp and %ebp registers to facilitate reliable continuation
(as discussed in Section 4.4.2.1). The scratch space can be conveniently located inside the
controlled page(s), so the addresses SCRATCH SPACE ADDR1 and SCRATCH SPACE ADDR2
can be easily computed accordingly. The payload then executes (semantically) the same
code as the shellcode to elevate privilege.
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x86-64 AArch32
push %rbp | push r3, lr
mov %rsp, %rbp | mov r0, #0
push %rbx | ldr r1, [pc, #16]
mov $<pkcred>, %rbx | blx r1
mov $<ccreds>, %rax | pop r3, lr
mov $0x0, %rdi | ldr r1, [pc, #8]
callq *%rax | bx r1
mov %rax, %rdi | <pkcred>
callq *%rbx | <ccreds>




Figure 4.3: The plain shellcode used in ret2dir exploits for x86-64 (left) and AArch32 (right)
targets (pkcred and ccreds correspond to the addresses of prepare kernel cred and
commit creds).
4.6.2 Performance
In systems without access to pagemap, ret2dir attacks have to rely on physmap spraying
to find a synonym that corresponds to the exploit payload. As discussed in Section 4.3.2,
the probability of randomly selecting a physmap address that maps to the exploit pay-
load depends on: (i) the amount of installed RAM, (ii) the physical memory load due to
competing processes, and (iii) the size of the physmap area. To assess this probability, we
performed a series of experiments under different system configurations and workloads.
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/* save orig. esp */
0xc10ed359 /* pop %edx ; ret */
<SCRATCH_SPACE_ADDR1>
0xc127547f /* mov %eax, (%edx) ; ret */
/* save orig. ebp */
0xc10309d5 /* xchg %eax, %ebp ; ret */
0xc10ed359 /* pop %edx ; ret */
<SCRATCH_SPACE_ADDR2>
0xc127547f /* mov %eax, (%edx) ; ret */
/* commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0))*/
0xc1258894 /* pop %eax ; ret */
0x00000000
0xc10735e0 /* addr. of prepare_kernel_cred */
0xc1073340 /* addr. of commit_creds’ */
/* restore the saved CPU state */
0xc1258894 /* pop %eax ; ret */
<SCRATCH_SPACE_ADDR2>
0xc1036551 /* mov (%eax), %eax ; ret */
0xc10309d5 /* xchg %eax, %ebp ; ret */
0xc1258894 /* pop %eax ; ret */
<SCRATCH_SPACE_ADDR1>
0xc1036551 /* mov (%eax), %eax ; ret */
0xc100a7f9 /* xchg %eax, %esp ; ret */
Figure 4.4: Example of an x86 ROP payload (kernel v3.8) used in our ret2dir exploits.


































Figure 4.5: Probability (Psucc) that a selected physmap address maps to the exploit payload
(successful exploitation) with a single attempt, when using physmap spraying, as a function
of the available RAM in the system.
Figure 4.5 shows the probability of successfully selecting a physmap address, with a
single attempt, as a function of the amount of RAM installed in our system. Our testbed
consisted of a single host armed with two 2.66GHz quad-core Intel Xeon X5500 CPUs
and 24GB of RAM, running 64-bit Debian Linux v7. Each bar denotes the average value
over 5 repetitions of the same experiment. On each iteration we count the percentage
of the maximum number of physmap-resident page frames that we managed to aquire,
using the spraying technique (Section 4.3.2), over the size of physmap. We used three
different workloads of increasing memory pressure: an idle system (Idle), a desktop-like
workload with constant browsing activity (Web) in multiple tabs (Facebook, Gmail, Twitter,
YouTube, and a mostly-static website), and a distributed kernel compilation (Kbuild) with
16 parallel threads running on 8 CPU cores (gcc, as, ld, make). Note that it is necessary
to maintain continuous activity in the competing processes for their working set to remain
hot, otherwise the ret2dir processes can easily “steal” their memory-resident pages.
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The probability of success increases with the amount of RAM. For the lowest-memory
configuration (1GB), the probability ranges between 65–68%, depending on the workload.
This small difference between the idle and the intensive workloads is an indication that
despite the continuous activity of the competing processes, the ret2dir processes manage
to claim a large amount of memory, as a result of their repeated accesses to already allo-
cated pages that in essence “lock” them to main memory. For the 2GB configuration the
probability jumps to 88%, and reaches 96% for 16GB.
Note that as these experiments were performed on a 64-bit system, physmap always
mapped all available memory. On 32-bit platforms, in which physmap maps only a subset
of RAM, the probability of success is even higher. As discussed in Section 4.3.1.1, in such
cases, the additional memory pressure created by competing processes, which more likely
were spawned before the ret2dir processes, helps “pushing” ret2dir allocations to the desired
zones (ZONE NORMAL, ZONE DMA) that fall within the physmap area. Finally, depending
on the vulnerability, it is quite common that an unsuccessful attempt will not result in a
kernel panic, allowing the attacker to run the exploit multiple times.
Availability
The complete set of exploits developed to assess the effectiveness of our ret2dir attack(s) is
available at: https://www.cs.columbia.edu/˜vpk/research/ret2dir/. Inter-
ested readers are referred to Appendix D for more information on how to use them.




In this chapter, we investigate whether a physical memory management approach that
enforces the explicit use of page frames by different security contexts (user vs. kernel), can
efficiently and effectively protect the OS kernel against ret2dir attacks.
Restricting access to /proc/<pid>/pagemap and similar interfaces, or disabling such
features completely (e.g., in Linux this can be easily achieved by compiling the kernel with-
out support for PROC PAGE MONITOR), is a simple step that can hinder, but not prevent,
ret2dir attacks. To that end, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of an
eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) scheme for Linux, which provides strong kernel
isolation and effective ret2dir protection with low overhead.
5.1.1 Threat Model
We assume a kernel hardened against ret2usr attacks using one (or a combination) of the
protection mechanisms outlined in Section 2.3. In addition, we assume an unprivileged
attacker with local access, who seeks to elevate privileges by exploiting a kernel-memory
corruption vulnerability [36, 29, 41, 30, 44, 27, 23, 45, 43, 42, 34, 33, 32, 24, 39, 35, 40, 38]
(see Section 2.2). Recall that in a kernel hardened against ret2usr attacks, the hijacked
control or data flow can no longer be redirected to user space in a direct manner, as the
respective ret2usr protection scheme(s) will block any such attempt.
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For that reason, we surmise the (ab)use of the implicit physical memory sharing be-
tween user processes and the kernel (e.g., through physmap), which allows an attacker to
deconstruct the isolation guarantees offered by ret2usr protection mechanisms, and redirect
the kernel’s control or data flow to user-controlled code or data.
Note that we do not make any assumption(s) regarding the type of corrupted data;
both code and data pointers are possible targets [192, 79, 69, 80, 78, 77, 74]. Overall, the
adversarial capabilities we presume are identical to those needed for carrying out the ret2dir
attacks introduced in Chapter 4.
5.2 Design
XPFO is a thin management layer that enforces exclusive ownership of page frames by
either the kernel or user-level processes. Specifically, under XPFO, page frames can never
be assigned to both kernel and user space, unless a kernel component explicitly requests
that (e.g., to implement zero-copy buffers [182]).
We opted for a design that does not penalize the performance-critical kernel allocators, at
the expense of low additional overhead whenever page frames are allocated to (or reclaimed
from) user processes. Recall that physical memory is allotted to user space using the
demand paging and copy-on-write (COW) methods [13], both of which rely on page faults
to allocate RAM. Hence, user processes already pay a runtime penalty for executing the
page fault handler and performing the necessary bookkeeping. XPFO aligns well with this
design philosophy, and increases only marginally the management and runtime overhead of
user-space page frame allocation.
Crucially, the physmap area is left untouched, and the slab allocator, as well as kernel
components that interface directly with the buddy allocator, continue to get pages that
are guaranteed to be physically contiguous and benefit from fast virtual-to-physical address
translations, as there are no extra page table walks or modifications (see Section 4.2.1).
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Figure 5.1: Overall XPFO operation. Whenever page frames are assigned to a user process,
XPFO unmaps their respective synonyms from physmap, breaking unintended aliasing and
ensuring that malicious content can no longer be “injected” to kernel space using ret2dir.
Figure 5.1 summarizes the operation of XPFO. Whenever a page frame is assigned
to a user process, XPFO unmaps its respective synonym from physmap, thus breaking
unintended aliasing and ensuring that malicious content can no longer be “injected” to
kernel space using ret2dir. Likewise, when a user process releases page frames back to
the kernel, XPFO maps the corresponding pages back in physmap to proactively facilitate
dynamic (kernel) memory requests.
A key requirement here is to wipe out the content of page frames that are returned by
(or reclaimed from) user processes, before making them available to the kernel. Otherwise,
a non-sanitizing XPFO scheme would be vulnerable to the following attack. A malicious
program spawns a child process that uses the techniques presented in Section 4.4 to map
its payload. Since XPFO is in place, the payload is unmapped from physmap and cannot
be addressed by the kernel. Yet, it will be mapped back once the child process terminates,
making it readily available to the malicious program for mounting a ret2dir attack.
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5.3 Implementation
We implemented XPFO in the Linux kernel v3.13. We devoted a significant amount of time
to engineer our patch to fulfill the design requirements described in Section 5.2, and make
as few and localized kernel modifications as possible—our aim is to to integrate XPFO in
future Linux releases. Our implementation (∼500LOC) keeps the management and runtime
overhead to the minimum, by employing a set of optimizations related to TLB handling
and page frame cleaning, and handles appropriately all cases in which page frames are al-
located to (and reclaimed from) user processes. Specifically, XPFO deals with: (a) demand
paging frames due to previously-requested anonymous and shared memory mappings (brk,
mmap/mmap2, mremap, shmat), (b) COW frames (fork, clone), (c) explicitly and im-
plicitly reclaimed frames ( exit, munmap, shmdt), (d) swapping (both swapped out and
swapped in pages), (e) NUMA frame migrations (migrate pages, move pages), and (f)
huge pages and transparent huge pages.
Handling the above cases is quite challenging. We first extended the system’s page frame
data structure (struct page) with the following fields: xpfo kmcnt (reference counter),
xpfo lock (spinlock) and xpfo flags (32-bit flags field)—struct page already con-
tains a flags field, but in 32-bit systems it is quite congested [48]. Note that although the
kernel keeps a struct page object for every page frame in the system, our change re-
quires only 3MB of additional space per 1GB of RAM (∼0.3% overhead). Moreover, out
of the 32 bits available in xpfo flags, we only make use of three: “Tainted” (T; bit 0),
“Zapped” (Z; bit 1), and “TLB-shootdown needed” (S; bit 2).
Next, we extended the buddy system. Whenever the buddy allocator receives re-
quests for page frames destined to user space (requests with GFP USER, GFP HIGHUSER, or
GFP HIGHUSER MOVABLE set to gfp flags), XPFO unmaps their respective synonyms
from physmap and asserts xpfo flags.T, indicating that the frames will be allotted to
userland and their contents are not trusted anymore. In contrast, for page frames destined
to kernel space, XPFO asserts xpfo flags.S (optimization; see Section 5.3.1).
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Whenever page frames are released to the buddy system, XPFO checks if xpfo flags.T
was previously asserted. If so, the frame was mapped to user space and needs to be wiped
out. After zeroing its contents, XPFO maps it back to physmap, resets xpfo flags.T,
and asserts xpfo flags.Z (optimization; more on that in Section 5.3.1). If xpfo flags.T
was not asserted, the buddy system reclaimed a frame previously allocated to the kernel
itself and no action is necessary (fast-path; no interference with kernel allocations). Note
that in 32-bit systems, the above are not performed if the page frame in question comes
from ZONE HIGHMEM—this zone contains page frames that are not direct-mapped.
Finally, to achieve complete support of cases (a)–(f), we leverage kmap/kmap atomic
and kunmap/kunmap atomic. These functions are used to temporarily (un)map page
frames acquired from ZONE HIGHMEM (see Section 4.3.1.1). In 64-bit systems, where the
whole RAM is direct-mapped, kmap/kmap atomic returns the address of the respective
page frame directly from physmap, whereas kunmap/kunmap atomic is defined as NOP
and optimized by the compiler. If XPFO is enabled, all of them are re-defined accordingly.
As user pages are (preferably) allocated from ZONE HIGHMEM, the kernel wraps all code
related to the cases we consider (e.g., demand paging, COW, swapping) with the above
functions. Kernel components that use kmap to operate on page frames not related to user
processes do exist, and we distinguish these cases using xpfo flags.T. If a page frame is
passed to kmap/kmap atomic and that bit is asserted, this means that the kernel tries to
operate on a frame assigned to user space via its kernel-resident synonym (e.g., to read its
contents for swapping it out), and thus is temporarily mapped back in physmap. Likewise,
in kunmap/kunmap atomic, page frames with xpfo flags.T asserted are unmapped.
Note that in 32-bit systems, the XPFO logic is executed on kmap routines only for direct-
mapped page frames (see Table 4.1). xpfo lock and xpfo kmcnt are used for handling
recursive or concurrent invocations of kmap/kmap atomic and kunmap/kunmap atomic
with the same page frame.
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5.3.1 Optimizations
The overhead of XPFO stems mainly from two factors: (i) sanitizing the content of re-
claimed pages, and (ii) TLB shootdown and flushing (necessary since we modify the kernel
page table). We employ three optimizations to keep that overhead to the minimum. As full
TLB flushes result in prohibitive slowdowns [102], in architectures that support single TLB
entry invalidation, XPFO selectively evicts only those entries that correspond to synonyms
in physmap that are unmapped; in x86/x86-64 this is done with the INVLPG instruction.
In systems with multi-core CPUs, XPFO must take into consideration TLB coherency
issues. Specifically, we have to perform a TLB shootdown whenever a page frame previously
assigned to the kernel itself is mapped to user space. XPFO extends the buddy system to
use xpfo flags.S for this purpose. If that flag is asserted when a page frame is alloted
to user space, XPFO invalidates the TLB entries that correspond to the synonym of that
frame in physmap, in every CPU core, by sending IPI interrupts to cascade TLB updates.
In all other cases (i.e., page frames passed from one process to another, reclaimed page
frames from user processes that are later on alloted to the kernel, and page frames allocated
to the kernel, reclaimed, and subsequently allocated to the kernel again), XPFO performs
only local TLB invalidations.
To alleviate the impact of page sanitization, we exploit the fact that page frames pre-
viously mapped to user space, and subsequently reclaimed by the buddy system, have
xpfo flags.Z asserted. We extended clear page to check xpfo flags.Z and avoid
clearing the frame if the bit is asserted. This optimization avoids zeroing a page frame
twice, in case it was first reclaimed by a user process and then subsequently allocated to
a kernel control path that required a clean page—clear page is invoked by every kernel
execution path that requires a zero-filled page frame.
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Benchmark Metric Original XPFO (%Overhead)
Apache Req/s 17636.30 17456.47 (%1.02)
NGINX Req/s 16626.05 16186.91 (%2.64)
PostgreSQL Trans/s 135.01 134.62 (%0.29)
Kbuild sec 67.98 69.66 (%2.47)
Kextract sec 12.94 13.10 (%1.24)
GnuPG sec 13.61 13.72 (%0.80)
OpenSSL Sign/s 504.50 503.57 (%0.18)
PyBench ms 3017.00 3025.00 (%0.26)
PHPBench Score 71111.00 70979.00 (%0.18)
IOzone MB/s 70.12 69.43 (%0.98)
tiobench MB/s 0.82 0.81 (%1.22)
dbench MB/s 20.00 19.76 (%1.20)
PostMark Trans/s 411.00 399.00 (%2.91)
Table 5.1: XPFO performance evaluation results using micro- and macro-benchmarks from
the Phoronix Test Suite.
5.4 Evaluation
5.4.1 Effectiveness
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed protection scheme, we used the ret2dir versions
of the real-world exploits presented in Section 4.6.1. We back-ported our XPFO patch to
each of the six kernel versions used in our previous evaluation (see Table 4.2), and tested
again our ret2dir exploits when XPFO was enabled. In all cases, XPFO prevented the
respective exploitation attempt.
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5.4.2 Performance
To assess the performance overhead of XPFO we used kernel v3.13, and a collection of micro-
and macro-benchmarks from the Phoronix Test Suite (PTS) [178]. PTS puts together stan-
dard system tests, like apachebench, pgbench, kernel build, and IOzone, which are
typically used by kernel developers to track performance regressions. Our testbed was the
same with the one used in Section 4.6.2; Table 5.1 summarizes our findings (the num-
bers reported are average values over 5 repetitions). Overall, XPFO introduces a minimal
(negligible in most cases) overhead, ranging between 0.18–2.91%.
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 Limitations
XPFO provides protection against ret2dir attacks, by braking the unintended address space
sharing between different security contexts. However, it does not prevent generic forms of
data sharing between kernel and user space, such as user-controlled content pushed to kernel
space via I/O buffers, the page cache, or system objects like pipes and message queues.
5.5.2 Alternative Design Approaches
5.5.2.1 Physical Memory Partitioning
An alternative solution to XPFO is to split physical memory in two mutually exclusive parts.
Pages frames in the first part are permanently assigned to the kernel and are pre-mapped
in the physmap area, while frames from the second part are alloted to user processes
on demand. This scheme guarantees by design that there are no synonyms of user-space
addresses in kernel space: page frames belong either to the kernel domain or the user
domain. An implementation of this scheme would require minimal changes in mm to ensure
that user-domain page frames are always assigned from the part of RAM that is not mapped
in physmap. As discussed in Section 4.3.1.1, in 32-bit systems ZONE HIGHMEM currently
contains page frames that cannot be directly addressed by the kernel through physmap, so
this or a similar zone could be leveraged for this purpose.
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Likewise, the kernel will use only frames from zone(s) that are included in the physmap
area. The main drawback of this approach is resource underutilization, as any unused page
frame in either part will not be available to the other part when the latter has depleted
its memory. For instance, although the kernel might still have available page frames for its
own use, it will refuse to provide them to user processes in case all user page frames have
been allocated. A more resource-efficient approach would be to dynamically adjust the size
of the two domains, although the overhead for doing so needs to be explored.
5.5.2.2 physmap Layout Randomization
Another potential mitigation against page frame spraying is to randomize the location of
physmap, by taking advantage of the ample virtual address space in 64-bit systems. The
simplest scheme would be to divide physmap into RAM-sized slots, and map the entire
RAM into one of them at boot time. In x86-64 the current size of physmap is 64TB (see
Table 4.1). Therefore, assuming a machine with 64GB RAM, the aforementioned scheme
will result in 1024 slots (i.e., 10 bits of randomization entropy). Even after successfully
spraying and occupying 96% of RAM, the attacker would now have to guess the right one
among the 1024 slots.
As the amount of RAM in future systems increases, however, randomization entropy
will drop, while (depending on the exploit) an attacker might be able to launch repeated
ret2dir attempts. In addition, this solution is not applicable in 32-bit systems, as in most
cases the size of the physical memory is close to (or exceeds) the size of physmap.
Availability
Our XPFO prototype, mainly implemented as a patch for Linux kernel v3.13, is freely
available at: https://www.cs.columbia.edu/˜vpk/research/xpfo/. Interested
readers are referred to Appendix E for more information on how to use it.




In this dissertation, we investigated the hypothesis that the security posture of modern OSes
can be improved by employing a synergy of defenses and exploit prevention techniques,
which guarantee the strong isolation between user and kernel space.
Towards this goal, we presented kGuard: a lightweight, compiler-based mechanism that
protects the kernel from ret2usr threats. Unlike previous work, kGuard is fast, flexible, and
offers cross-platform support. It works by injecting fine-grained inline guards during the
translation phase, which are resistant to bypass, and it does not require any modification to
the kernel. kGuard can safeguard 32- or 64-bit OSes that map a mixture of code segments
with different privileges inside the same scope and are susceptible to ret2usr attacks. We be-
lieve that it strikes a balance between safety and functionality, and provides comprehensive
protection, as demonstrated by our extensive evaluation with real exploits against Linux.
In addition, we presented ret2dir: a novel kernel exploitation technique that takes advan-
tage of direct-mapped physical memory regions in kernel space to bypass deployed ret2usr
protections. To improve kernel isolation, we designed and implemented XPFO: an exclusive
page frame ownership scheme for the Linux kernel, which prevents the implicit sharing of
physical memory, thereby ensuring that user-controlled content can no longer be injected
into kernel space using ret2dir. The results of our experimental evaluation demonstrate
that XPFO offers effective protection with negligible runtime overhead.
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6.2 Future Directions
As commodity software is increasingly used in mission-critical settings, improving the trust-
worthiness of key elements in the software stack becomes an issue of utmost importance.
To this end, we introduced new techniques to protect essential software components, like
OS kernels (kGuard [116, 115], XPFO [114]). However, the bulk of the work still lies ahead.
Going forward, we plan to address the security challenges of the unique software ecosystem
that emerging technologies, like mobile and cloud computing, have started shaping. The
following research directions capture our vision towards next-generation software protection.
6.2.1 Agile Software Hardening
Despite years of research, software hardening still revolves around the concept of defense
in depth. The basic premise behind this strategy to protection is that by stacking together
different exploit mitigation techniques, software compromise becomes harder. However,
this “blanket” approach to software security (i.e., “protect everything, the same way, all
the time, at the same intensity”) works well only with defences that have negligible, or
close to zero, performance overhead and are oblivious to the setting(s) in which the hard-
ened software is used. Hence, as security-critical components, like OS kernels, language
runtime environments, cryptographic libraries, etc., are utilized verbatim in a multitude of
diverse domains—ranging from mobile settings to cloud computing environments—software
providers are coerced to employ “cheap” exploit mitigations with lax security guarantees,
rather than modern protection primitives with assured security; the latter typically inflict
non-negligible runtime slowdowns or operate only on platforms with specific characteris-
tics. Consequently, the majority of the software stack remains armored with rudimentary
broad-spectrum defense schemes, such as ASLR, NX memory, and compiler-based tripwires
(e.g., stack canaries, memory poisoning), despite the latest advances in the development of
protections with guaranteed security properties.
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Looking forward, we believe that we should rethink how we harden our systems. As es-
sential software components move rapidly from one domain to another to meet the demands
of emerging software ecosystems (i.e., app stores and mashup cloud applications), which
rely heavily on software of unknown quality and provenance, the problems of the blanket
approach will only be exacerbated. The preclusion of every protection mechanism that does
not align with the “always-on, applicable-everywhere” mode of operation culminates in a
monoculture of defenses (i.e., the same exploit mitigations are used repeatedly in environ-
ments with fundamentally different security requirements and characteristics), which allows
adversaries to automate their techniques for bypassing protections and reliably exploit soft-
ware running in dissimilar settings with minimal (additional) effort.
To address these challenges, we envision a next-generation security architecture that
enables defenses to be constantly in flux, fostering the deployment and use of protection
mechanisms like Data Flow Tracking (DFT) [113]—heavyweight, yet principled and very
effective—as and where needed in a strategic manner. Our goal is to infuse systems with the
ability to dynamically change their defenses along several dimensions, by elevating hard-
ening rectification and agility to first-rate principles. The benefits of such an approach
to software security are manifold. First, hardening agility creates a diversified and unpre-
dictable environment, which naturally breaks the monoculture of defenses and hinders the
ability of adversaries to use standard recipes for bypassing exploit mitigations. Second,
hardening rectification allows software to make the best use of the hardening capabilities
that a particular setting offers, and dynamically adapt the deployed defences to meet certain
needs. For instance, intensify the hardening level to protect against an active exploitation
attempt, or turn off redundant protections to increase performance and preserve power.
To support this effort, we plan to build upon our prior work on Virtual Application
Partitioning [87] and investigate compiler-assisted techniques that efficiently, and transpar-
ently (to the extent possible), enable systems to adapt the (a.) granularity (coarse-grain vs.
fine-grain), (b.) intensity, and (c.) layering, of the deployed protection mechanisms, based
on the (i) environment in which the software is executing (e.g., mobile device, cloud plat-
form), (ii) data that the application operates upon (high-value vs. low-value), (iii) innate
properties of particular code parts (high-privileged vs. deprivileged/sandboxed), and (iv)
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external events. In addition, we plan to explore minimal hardware extensions for boosting
certain kinds of heavyweight runtime protections, such as CFI and DFT [113, 104]. Finally,
in the longer term, our aim is to leverage automated program verification techniques for
applying defense mechanisms strategically, in a very fine-grained and targeted manner (e.g.,
only in code parts that certain safety properties cannot be proven to hold, or only when an
application operates on inputs that are proven to be unsafe), in a spirit similar to that of
Taint Flow Algebra [105].
6.2.2 Kernel Security
Kernel protection is a fertile and challenging research area that we plan to continue work-
ing on, as kernel exploitation is currently turning into one of the primary methods for
compromising (hardened) systems. ret2usr [116, 115] and ret2dir [114]—the two attacks we
introduced as part of this dissertation—signified the importance of proper isolation between
the OS kernel and user processes, by demonstrating how the weak separation of different
protection domains (i.e., kernel space vs. user space) can be leveraged to completely sub-
vert state-of-the-art kernel defenses. Going forward, we plan to explore kernel designs, and
hardware extensions, which can safely combine different protection domains without trading
security for performance, or vice versa.
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Appendix A
Examples of ret2usr Exploits
ret2usr attacks are usually manifested by overwriting kernel-resident control data (e.g.,
return addresses, jump tables, function pointers) with user-space addresses (see Section 2.2).
In early versions of such exploits, this was accomplished by invoking a (vulnerable) system
call with carefully crafted arguments to nullify a function pointer. When the NULL function
pointer is eventually dereferenced, control is transferred to address zero that resides in user
space. Commonly, that address is not used by processes and is unmapped.1 However, if the
attacker has local access to the system, she can build a program with arbitrary data or code
mapped at address zero (or any other address in her program for that matter). Note that
since the attacker controls the program, its memory pages can be mapped both writable
and executable, and placed at known locations (i.e., kernel-space ASLR and WˆX measures
do not apply).
1In Linux, accessing an unmapped page, when running in kernel mode, results into a kernel oops and
subsequently causes the OS to kill the offending process (unless a lock is held, in which case Linux will result
into a kernel panic). Other OSes fail-stop directly with a kernel panic.
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A.1 sendpage ret2usr Linux Exploit
736 sock = f i l e −>p r i v a t e da t a ;
737 f l a g s = ! ( f i l e −> f f l a g s & ONONBLOCK) ? 0 : MSGDONTWAIT;
738 i f (more )
739 f l a g s |= MSGMORE;
740 / ∗ [ ! ] NULL po in t e r d e r e f e r en c e ( sendpage ) [ ! ] ∗/
741 return sock−>ops−>sendpage ( sock , page , o f f s e t , s i z e , f l a g s ) ;
Listing A.1: NULL function pointer in Linux (net/socket.c).
Listing A.1 shows a straightforward NULL function pointer vulnerability that affected all
Linux kernel versions released between May 2001 and August 2009 (v2.4.4/v2.6.0 – v2.4.37/-
v2.6.30.4) [26]. If the sendfile system call is invoked with a socket descriptor belonging
to a vulnerable protocol family, the value of the sendpage pointer in line 741 is set to
NULL. This results in an indirect function call to address zero, which can be exploited by
attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges.
Figure A.1 illustrates the steps taken by a malicious process to exploit the vulnerability
in x86. It starts by invoking the sendfile system call with the offending arguments (i.e., a
datagram socket of a vulnerable protocol family, such as PF IPX). The corresponding libc
wrapper (0xB7F50D20) traps to the OS via the SYSENTER instruction (0xB7FE2419)
and the generated software interrupt leads to executing the system call handler of Linux
(sysenter do call()). The handler dynamically resolves the address of sys sendfile
(0xC01D0CCF) using the array sys call table, which includes the kernel address of
every supported system call, indexed by system call number (0xC01039DB).2 Privileged
execution then continues until the offending sock sendpage() routine is invoked. Due to
the arguments passed in sendfile, the value of the sendpage pointer (0xFA7C8538) is
NULL and results in an indirect function call to address zero. This transfers control to the
attacker, who can execute arbitrary code with kernel privilege.
2The address 0xC03FD3A8 corresponds to the kernel-memory address of sys call table.







































0x08049d1d: call 0xb7d7d62c [user text]




Figure A.1: Control transfers that occur during the exploitation of a ret2usr attack. The
sendfile system call, on x86 Linux, causes a function pointer in kernel to become NULL,
illegally transferring control to user space code.
A.2 tee ret2usr Linux Exploit
1333 / ∗ [ ! ] NULL po in t e r d e r e f e r en c e ( ops ) [ ! ] ∗/
1334 ibu f−>ops−>get ( ip ip e , i bu f ) ;
1335 obuf = opipe−>bufs + nbuf ;
1336 ∗ obuf = ∗ i b u f ;
Listing A.2: NULL data pointer in Linux (fs/splice.c).
31 struct p ip e bu f op e r a t i on s {
32 int can merge ;
33 void∗ (∗map) ( /∗ . . . ∗/ ) ;
34 void (∗unmap) ( /∗ . . . ∗/ ) ;
35 int (∗ pin ) ( /∗ . . . ∗/ ) ;
36 void (∗ r e l e a s e ) ( /∗ . . . ∗/ ) ;
37 int (∗ s t e a l ) ( /∗ . . . ∗/ ) ;
38 void (∗ get ) ( /∗ . . . ∗/ ) ;
39 } ;
Listing A.3: struct pipe buf operations (include/linux/pipe fs i.h).
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Listing A.2 shows the Linux kernel bug exploited by Spengler [199]. The ops field in
line 1334, which is a data pointer of type struct pipe buf operations, becomes NULL
after the invocation of the tee system call. Upon dereferencing ops, the effective address
of a function is obtained via get, which is mapped to the seventh double word (assuming an
x86 architecture) after the address pointed by ops (i.e., due to the definition of structure
pipe buf operations; see Listing A.3). Hence, the kernel reads a code pointer from
0x0000001C, which is controlled by the user. This enables an attacker to redirect the
control flow of the kernel to an arbitrary address.
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Appendix B
kGuard RTL Internals
branchprot instrument(), our instrumentation callback, is invoked by the GCC pass
manager for every translation unit after all RTL optimizations have been applied, and
exactly before the target code is emitted. At this point, the corresponding translation
unit is maintained as graph of basic blocks (BBs) that contain chained sequences of RTL
instructions, also known as rtx expressions (i.e., LISP-like assembler code for an abstract
machine with infinite registers).
GCC maintains a specific graph-based data structure (call-graph) that holds infor-
mation for every internal/external call site. However, indirect control transfers are not
represented in it and are assumed to be control-flow neutral. For that reason we perform
the following. We begin by iterating over all the BBs and rtx expressions of the respective
translation unit, selecting only the computed calls and jumps. This includes rtx objects of
type CALL INSN or JUMP INSN that branch via a register or memory location. Note that
ret instructions are also encoded as rtx objects of type JUMP INSN. Next, we modify the
rtx expression stream for inserting the CFAR and CFAM checks. The CFAR guards are inserted
by splitting the original BB into 3 new ones. The first hosts all the rtx expressions before
{CALL, JUMP} INSN, along with the random NOP sled and two more rtx expressions that
match the compare (cmp) and jump (jae) instructions shown in Listing 3.1. The second
BB contains the code for loading the address of the violation handler into the branch reg-
ister (i.e., mov in x86), while the last BB contains the actual branch expression along with
the remaining rtx expressions of the original BB.
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Lastly, the process also involves altering the control-flow graph, by chaining the new
BBs accordingly and inserting the proper branch labels to ensure that the injected code
remains inlined. CFAM instrumentation is performed in a similar fashion.
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Appendix C
kGuard Distribution
Our kGuard bundle [110] contains the following tools:
• kguard: a GCC plugin that implements CFA-based control-flow confinement and
code inflation, as specified in Section 3.2, Section 3.3, and Appendix B.
• kvld: a helper tool that detects and reports unprotected (exploitable) control transfer
instructions in ELF [219] objects, along with a kguard instrumentation summary.
Although kGuard is a cross-platform solution, both kguard and kvld were mainly
evaluated in x86/x86-64 Linux. Earlier versions were successfully used with members of the
BSD family and the ARM platform (AArch32), but our latest release was solely developed
and tested on Debian GNU/Linux v6 [61] and v7 [62].
C.1 Limitations
kGuard is implemented as an RTL IR optimization pass (see Section 3.3 and Appendix B),
and as such, it does not handle assembler code (both “inline” and external). Hence, any
indirect control-flow transfer embedded in assembly snippets is left unprotected. Note,
however, that this is not a fundamental limitation of kGuard, but rather an implementation
decision. In principle, one can incorporate the techniques presented in Section 3.2 (i.e.,
CFA-based control-flow confinement, code inflation, and CFA motion) in the assembler,
instead of the compiler, as they do not require high-level semantics.
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In addition, our released prototype does not include support for the following features:
• Liveness analysis for minimizing register spilling in CFAM guards (see Section 3.2).
Even though initial versions of kGuard included support for that feature, we had to
significantly rewrite the respective code when we ported kguard from GCC v4.5 [85]
to v4.6 [86]. Hence, to avoid fragmentation, and given the limited performance ben-
efits of the feature, we opted for a scheme that always spills a fixed register (i.e.,
%edi/%rdi in x86/x86-64), as shown in Listing 3.3.
• CFA motion (see Section 3.2.2.2). Although kguard supports the log parameter,
which records all necessary information to perform CFA relocation, it does not han-
dle the actual rewriting of the .text segment of the kernel/modules. The latter
is performed through a kernel component that is OS- and architecture-specific. In
Section 3.2.2.2, we describe, in detail, how to implement CFA motion in x86 Linux
(kernel v2.6.32) and {Free, Net}BSD.
• NOP sled in the beginning of the kernel .text segment. Code inflation randomizes
the starting address of the kernel .text segment, by inserting a (huge) NOP sled of
random length its beginning (see Section 3.2.2.2). Again, though original versions of
kguard included support for that feature, we decided to remove it from our latest
release, as many commodity OSes begun employing kernel-space ASLR [68].
C.2 Building kGuard
What follows are the steps to build kguard from source. We assume a Debian GNU/Linux
distribution (v6 [61] or v7 [62]; x86/x86-64) and the latest release of kGuard (v3.14159alpha
at the time of writing).
• Dependencies:
– GNU make v3.81 (or later) [89], GNU binutils v2.22 (or later) [91].
– GCC v4.5 [85] or v4.6 [86] (versions ≥ 4.7 are not supported).
– libbsd v0.4.2 (or later) [83].








cd kguard-src && make
If the build process is successful, kguard (kguard.so) will be made available in the
working directory ; kvld is implemented as an AWK [3] script, and therefore, no compi-
lation is necessary. In Debian and Debian-derived distributions (e.g., Ubuntu), the build
dependencies can be satisfied by installing the following packages: build-essential,
gcc-4.{5, 6}-plugin-dev, libbsd-dev. Note that we recommend building kguard
with the same version of GCC used to compile protected kernels, by setting the CC and
CFLAGS variables, accordingly, in Makefile. Lastly, kguard.h includes the default
value(s) for the starting address of the kernel .text segment. Hence, if kGuard is used in
experimental settings, KADDR DFL needs to be modified accordingly.1
C.3 Using kGuard
C.3.1 kguard
Once kguard (kguard.so) is successfully built, one can start compiling kGuard-protected
kernels by leveraging the -fplugin and -fplugin-arg parameters of GCC. In Linux,
which uses the kBuild system [15], we recommend supplying the respective parameters
through the CFLAGS variable or by directly editing the main Makefile of the kernel and
altering KBUILD CFLAGS. As stated in Section 3.3, kGuard accepts 3 parameters: stub
(address or symbol), nop (decimal integer), and log (file path). stub provides the name of
the runtime violation handler, nop stores the maximum size of the random NOP sled inserted
1 For example, in x86 OpenBSD KADDR DFL should be set to 0xD0000000.
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before each CFA, and log is used to define an instrumentation logfile for CFA motion. In
addition, our latest prototype supports the retprot (boolean) flag for controlling the
instrumentation of ret instructions (x86/x86-64 only). The default parameter values are
the following: stub = panic, nop = 16, log = NULL, and retprot = 1.
In common settings, appending ‘-fplugin=<full-path>/kguard.so’2 to the build
flags should be sufficient for compiling a kGuard-protected kernel; specific parameters can
be further tailored to need with -fplugin-arg. For example, the (maximum) size of the
NOP sleds can be doubled (i.e., from 16 to 32 NOPs), and the runtime violation handler can
be redefined (e.g., from panic to chndl), with ‘-fplugin-arg-kguard-nop=32’ and
‘-fplugin-arg-kguard-stub=chndl’, respectively. Note that certain (sub)directories
of the kernel source tree may have to be excluded from being instrumented with kguard.
Examples include early, machine-dependent bootstrap code (e.g., arch/x86/boot/ in
x86/x86-64 Linux), the vDSO [49] (i.e., arch/x86/vdso in x86-64 Linux), etc.
In recent Linux kernels, the above can be performed with the CFLAGS REMOVE macro
of kBuild, whereas in all other cases, every kGuard-related directive should be manually
stripped from the build flags. The latest Linux kernel that we successfully built with kGuard
was v3.2; we appended ‘-fplugin=<full-path>/kguard.so’ to KBUILD CFLAGS in






kvld can be used with any x86/x86-64 kGuard-instrumented ELF file (kobj) as follows:
objdump -d <kobj> | cut -f3 | kvld.
2
<full-path>: absolute path of the directory that contains kguard.so.
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Appendix D
ret2dir Distribution
The ret2dir exploits we developed against hardened x86/x86-64 Linux targets (see Sec-
tion 4.6.1; Table 4.2) are all publicly available, primarily serving two purposes:
1. Educate the community regarding ret2dir attacks.
2. Provide a testbed for evaluating future ret2dir protection mechanisms.
Our ret2dir distribution [111] contains the following:
• ret2dir {amd64, i386}.vmwarevm: two VMs that run atop VMware’s hyper-
visors (Player [213], Workstation [214], Fusion [212]). Both VMs target VMware
hardware specification v10 and use Debian GNU/Linux v7 [62] as guest OS.
• getpmap: a helper tool for querying the /proc/<pid>/pagemap interface.
D.1 ret2dir Virtual Machines
ret2dir amd64.vmwarevm is configured to use 2 vCPUs and 2GB of RAM, booting 64-
bit kernels, whereas ret2dir i386.vmwarevm is configured to use 2 vCPUs and 4GB of
RAM, booting 32-bit kernels, as shown in Figure D.1 and Figure D.2, respectively.
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Figure D.1: ret2dir amd64.vmwarevm running over a VMware hypervisor. Entries
beginning with “[-]” correspond to vanilla Linux kernels without any ret2usr protection.
Entries beginning with “[+]” indicate Linux kernels hardened against ret2usr attacks—the
protection mechanisms enabled are listed after “with”. Names in parentheses indicate the
exploit(s) that the respective kernel is vulnerable to.
GRUB kernel entries beginning with “[-]” correspond to vanilla Linux kernels without
any ret2usr protection. Conversely, entries beginning with “[+]” correspond to Linux
kernels hardened against ret2usr attacks, while the exact ret2usr protection mechanisms
enabled are listed after “with”. Lastly, names in parentheses indicate the exploit(s) that
the respective kernel is vulnerable to.
D.2 ret2dir Exploitation Kit
The credentials to login to the guest OS are the following:
• Username: ‘w00t’
• Password: ‘pwn3d’
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Figure D.2: ret2dir i386.vmwarevm running over a VMware hypervisor. GRUB entries
beginning with “[-]” correspond to vanilla Linux kernels without any ret2usr protection.
Entries beginning with “[+]” indicate Linux kernels hardened against ret2usr attacks—the
protection mechanisms enabled are listed after “with”. Names in parentheses indicate the
exploit(s) that the respective kernel is vulnerable to.
We have developed and pre-installed a ret2dir exploitation kit (ekit) on both VMs,
which automates the process of running the proper exploit(s) on the kernel used to boot
the guest OS. Once logged in, ekit can be invoked by running ekit/runme.
ekit automatically detects and reports the Linux kernel version used, along with all
ret2usr protection mechanisms available (if any) and a summary of certain system charac-
teristics (e.g., the CPU model, RAM size, the size of ZONE HIGHMEM in 32-bit kernels).
Based on that it will also list the exploits available for the specific kernel version, including
the EDB-ID and CVE number(s) of each exploit. Upon selecting a particular exploit to
run, ekit will provide the option to invoke either the ret2usr or ret2dir variant, suggesting
to execute the one that bypasses deployed protections.
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The purpose of ekit is to enable users experiment with multiple combinations. For
instance, a user can invoke a ret2usr exploit on a hardened kernel, to first verify that the
respective ret2dir protection mechanisms work, and then execute the ret2dir variant of the
same exploit on the same kernel, to observe how the techniques presented in Section 4.3
can bypass deployed ret2dir defenses. The source code of all ret2usr and ret2dir exploits
used by ekit is available at ‘ekit/ret2usr/’ and ‘ekit/ret2dir/’, respectively.1
Finally, note that both VMs come pre-configured with a GDB [92] kernel stub, allowing
the remote debugging of the guest OS and vulnerable kernels. ret2dir i386.vmwarevm
can be debugged from the host OS by connecting to port 8832 ((gdb) target remote
localhost:8832), whereas ret2dir amd64.vmwarevm can be debugged by connecting
to port 8864.
D.3 getpmap
getpmap can be used with any Linux kernel that exports /proc/<pid>/pagemap as
follows: getpmap -p <pid> -a <vaddr>. The decimal number returned by getpmap is
the PFN that corresponds to virtual address <vaddr> of process <pid>.
1 For brevity, all our ret2dir exploits use the deterministic technique described in Section 4.3.1.
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Appendix E
XPFO Distribution
Our XPFO prototype implements the page frame ownership scheme described in Section 5.3,
along with the optimizations outlined in Section 5.3.1, and is freely available as a patch for
Linux kernel v3.13 [164]. The initial version of XPFO supported both the x86 and x86-64
architectures. However, our latest release has been mainly tested and evaluated on x86-64
Debian GNU/Linux v7 [62].
E.1 Patching the Linux Kernel
What follows are the steps to patch the Linux kernel and add support for XPFO.
• Dependencies:
– GNU patch v2.6.1 (or later) [90].
• Patch steps (we assume that the working directory is set to the topmost directory of
Linux kernel v3.13 source code [164]):
1. Download the XPFO patch [112]:
wget https://www.cs.columbia.edu/˜vpk/research/xpfo/linux-3.13-xpfo.
patch
2. Apply the patch:
patch -p1 < linux-3.13-xpfo.patch
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Figure E.1: XPFO can be enabled by running make menuconfig (once the kernel is
patched) and asserting the XPFO kernel configuration option under “Kernel Hacking”.
E.2 Enabling XPFO
After successfully patching the kernel, XPFO can be enabled by asserting the XPFO kernel
configuration option. This can be performed by appending ‘CONFIG XPFO=y’ to .config,
or by invoking make menuconfig1 and enabling XPFO under “Kernel Hacking”, as shown in
Figure E.1. Note that XPFO requires DEBUG KERNEL and X86 configuration options being
enabled, and HIBERNATION,DEBUG PAGEALLOC, and KMEMCHECK, being disabled. Lastly,
the XPFO-enabled kernel can be compiled using the standard build procedure [156]. Dur-
ing boot time the following message is appended to system message buffer, indicating that
XPFO is active: XPFO (eXclusive Page Frame Ownership) protection: active.
1Alternatively, make {n, x, g}config can be used.
